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Abstract
Countries with weaker domestic investor protection hold less diversified international portfolios.
An equilibrium business cycle model of North-South capital flow with corporate governance fric-
tions between outside investors and corporate insiders explains this phenomenon through two
channels. First, weak governance leads to concentrated ownership in the South because inter-
national diversification by insiders is penalized by lower stock market valuation. This reduces
the float portfolio, or the supply of South assets. Second, weak governance tilts the demand of
South outside investors towards domestic assets to hedge labor income risk. This is due to a
higher share of labor in income, which increases labor income risk. In addition, the dynamics of
investment under insider control leads relative dividend and labor income to be more negatively
correlated in the South, making domestic assets a better hedge against local labor income risk.
I find that the insider ownership and hedging channels are responsible for at least 29% and 11%,
respectively, of the cross-country variation in international diversification. Thus, weak institu-
tions lower international diversification primarily through concentrated ownership of firms, with
outsider hedging also playing a quantitatively significant role.
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Figure 1: International Diversification and Institutions.
Notes: Institutional quality measured by the LaPorta et al. (1998) indices on the x-axis. The
ratio of foreign equity assets (liabilities) to national wealth in panel 1 (2) on the y-axis. The
points represents the time average for each country. Data source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007) and LaPorta et al. (1998).
Institutions, which cover a broad spectrum of economic arrangements such as courts of law, cor-
porate governance standards and the quality of contract enforcement, have recently received much
attention as determinants of economic performance. Though it is acknowledged that the dual in-
stitutions of investor protection laws and corporate insider ownership play a critical role in setting
the “limits of financial globalization” (see Stulz, 2005), the precise channels through which they
influence international capital flows, as well as their magnitudes, are not well understood.1 This
paper presents a theory and some empirics that fill this gap in the literature on international capital
flows.
The main stylized fact that motivates this paper, the so-called limits of financial globalization,
can be seen in Figure 1. The first (second) panel draws a scatter plot with institutional quality on
the horizontal axis and foreign equity – portfolio equity and FDI – assets (liabilities) as a fraction of
national wealth on the vertical axis for a group of 41 countries (20 developed markets, 21 emerging
markets).2 It appears that countries with lower institutional quality (“the South”) hold fewer
1Rene´ Stulz in his presidential address delivered at the American Finance Association Meetings in 2005 speaks
about the “limits of financial globalization”.
2Details about the sample selection criteria, data sources, and construction for Figure 1 are provided in Section 3
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foreign equity assets and issue fewer foreign equity liabilities. I show later using regressions that
this appears to be robust to a variety of control variables and alternative explanations, and is not
driven by broad differences across the groups of advanced and emerging nations. This feature has
been noted by Coeurdacier and Rey (2013), and has also been found in disaggregated data on
foreign equity liabilities by authors such as Dahlquist et al. (2003) and Kho et al. (2009). The
second characteristic of the data that motivates the paper is the greater ownership of firm equity
by domestic corporate insiders in the South (see LaPorta et al., 1999; Kho et al., 2009).
The first pattern appears to be counter-intuitive at first pass: why would countries with worse
domestic institutions be more home-biased in their equity holdings, while having apparently better
alternatives in countries with better institutions (“the North”)? The two patterns together raise
several intriguing questions about portfolio allocation when corporate insiders, and outsiders, co-
exist. For instance, to what extent is poor investor protection responsible for insider ownership
and the lack of international diversification? Given a certain amount of insider ownership, what
determines the composition of ownership of the float portfolio between foreign versus domestic
investors?3 What are the general equilibrium channels through which investor protection affects
the extent of international diversification of countries?
To answer these questions and better understand the role of agency problems and firm insiders
in shaping capital flows, I develop a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of
international portfolio choice with two distinct representative agents in each country – a corporate
“insider” and an “outsider” investor. An insider is an entrepreneur and large shareholder who has
control over the investment, dividend, and employment policies of a firm by virtue of her sizeable
equity stake. In contrast to an insider, an outsider is a small investor who owns stock in a firm but
has no direct control over its operations. The majority of her income comes from supplying labor.
In short, she fits the description of the classical atomistic agent in a business cycle model. Weaker
institutions lower the ability of outsiders to hold insiders accountable for their decisions through
the mechanisms of corporate governance. I incorporate the conflict of interest that arises between
these two parties when the latter has full control of the firm, yet owns only a part of it. Weaker
institutions, by opening up opportunities for self-interested behavior by insiders, affect the payoffs
of claims to the firm’s dividends. This influences the portfolio choice of both outsiders and insiders,
yielding two main results.
First, I find that lower institutional quality drives lower international diversification by insiders,
which in turn lowers the supply of investible domestic assets for outside investors. In other words,
the domestic float portfolio in the South is smaller since insiders’ demand for foreign assets is
lowered by weaker institutions. I label this the “insider ownership” channel. Second, I find that
for a given size of the float portfolio, domestic outsiders in the South also wish to hold a smaller
and the appendix.
3The float portfolio is the fraction of a country’s stock market that is actively traded in equity markets, and is
equal to the part not held by insiders.
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share of the foreign stock index. This arises due to a higher labor-dividend ratio in the South and a
negative covariance of labor and dividend income. I label this the “outsider hedging” channel. The
aggregate country share of foreign assets in wealth in the model is an average of the equilibrium
holdings of insiders and outsiders.
The insider ownership channel, that the South has greater insider ownership of firms, and
hence, a smaller float portfolio, works through a mechanism that has been studied by Admati
et al. (1994) and DeMarzo and Urosˇevic´ (2006) in closed economy partial equilibrium models.
As noted earlier, weaker institutions in the South let domestic insiders extract private benefits of
control. Lower insider equity, by reducing the insider’s ownership of cash-flow rights of the firm,
increases extraction. Thus, risk-averse Southern insiders, wishing to diversify country-specific risk
by buying foreign assets, can only sell their stake at a discount; outside investors, anticipating
greater extraction, are only willing to trade shares with the insider at a lower price corresponding
to the lower post-trade level of insider ownership. This acts as an endogenous “transaction tax”
on the insider’s portfolio adjustments. The insider’s trade-off, between the potential benefits of
diversification and the penalty of the transaction tax, determines the size of the float portfolio of a
country. Since the effect of the transaction tax dominates in the Southern equilibrium, it ends up
with more insider ownership. This outcome can be thought of as home bias on the part of insiders,
which also reduces the supply of investible South assets.
The outsider hedging channel, that Southern outsiders hold a smaller share of the foreign equity
index, follows from the impact of imperfect corporate governance on the share of labor in total
income and the ability of domestic assets to hedge risks related to this labor income. I first show
that weaker governance implies a higher share of labor income in total income. This increases the
risk arising from labor income. In addition, building on Heathcote and Perri (2013) and Coeurdacier
and Gourinchas (2012), I show that domestic assets are a better hedge against labor income risk
in countries with weaker institutions.4 The underlying mechanism, working primarily through the
insiders’ decisions about the dynamics of investment and how that influences the covariance of
dividend and labor income, draws on an extensive literature in financial economics (see LaPorta
et al., 2000; Nenova, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004) showing that insiders in the South can extract
rents from firms as private benefits of control. Since more rents can be extracted from larger firms,
insiders effectively become empire-builders as in the classic free cash flow problem setup described
by Jensen (1986).
Consider the case of a positive productivity shock. Empire-building affects the resultant dy-
namics of investment in the following way. When hit by a persistent positive productivity shock,
insiders in the South find it privately optimal to reduce dividends below the first-best level to fi-
nance socially suboptimal capital investments in expectation of higher future private benefits. As
4The hedging properties of domestic assets as a possible explanation of home bias has also been explored by Cole
and Obstfeld (1991), Baxter and Jermann (1997), Engel and Matsumoto (2009), van Wincoop and Warnock (2010),
and Coeurdacier et al. (2010), among others.
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a result dividends shrink relative to the North. At the same time, the shock tends to increase labor
income in the South, relative to the North. Thus imperfect corporate governance amplifies the neg-
ative correlation between relative dividends and relative labor earnings in the South. Consequently,
home bias for domestic outside investors is greater in the South, due to their increased demand
for domestic shares for the purpose of hedging their labor income risk. In general equilibrium,
this also leads to lower Northern ownership of the Southern float portfolio, and more home bias in
the North. As in Coeurdacier et al. (2010), this key result is shown to be robust to the ability of
outsiders to trade bonds, and to alternative exogenous shocks.
I then evaluate the quantitative and empirical importance of these two channels. I find that even
though both channels work in the same direction, the insider ownership channel is responsible for
at least 29% of the cross-country variation in international diversification, with the hedging channel
contributing at least 11%. Potentially, these individual channels contribute even more to the cross-
sectional variation in diversification, and together can explain up to 60% of the variation. These
calculations are explained in detail later. Thus, I conservatively conclude that weak institutions
lower international diversification primarily through concentrated ownership of firms, with outsider
hedging also playing a quantitatively significant role.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the theory, solves analytically for
outsider portfolios when countries are symmetric, and numerically evaluates the determination of
insider ownership and outsider portfolios when countries are asymmetric. Section 3 compares data
generated from the model to actual data, and provides an assessment of the empirical importance
of the two channels. Section 4 summarizes the results, discusses some alternative hypotheses, and
concludes.
2 A Portfolio Model With Corporate Governance Frictions
This section develops an international business cycle (IBC) model with two countries that differ
in the strength of their investor protection and corporate governance. Most elements of the model
are quite standard in the IBC literature (see Coeurdacier et al., 2010; Heathcote and Perri, 2013).
The key differences, wherever they appear, are highlighted.
2.1 Goods and Assets Markets
There are two countries in the world – North and South. Each country produces an internationally
traded intermediate good. a(st) is produced only in the North, and b(st) only in the South.5 The
5At each time t, the economy is in state st ∈ S, where S is the set of possible states of the world. The sequence of
events from the start of time till date t is denoted by the history st. Except for the total output of the intermediate
goods in the North and the South, which are denoted by Ya and Yb respectively, all quantities associated with the
South are superscripted with a “*”. Only the equations for the North are laid out for brevity. The corresponding
expressions for the South are excluded except where they are important for understanding the structure or mechanics
of the model.
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production function for the intermediate good in the North, Ya (Yb for the South), is
Ya(s
t) = Z(st)K(st−1)θL(st)1−θ, (2.1)
where K and L denote capital and labor inputs. The only source of uncertainty is technology in
the intermediate goods sector of each country, Z(st) (and Z∗(st)), which are exogenous stochastic
processes and symmetric across the two countries.
Intermediate goods are used in the production of the final consumption-investment good in each
country (Y (st) and Y ∗(st) in the North and South, respectively) using standard CES technology.
Y (st) = [ωa(st)
σ−1
σ + (1− ω)b(st)σ−1σ ] σσ−1 (2.2)
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic intermediates.6 The optimal
combinations of the two intermediate goods used to produce Y (st) are given by:
ωY (st)
1
σ a(st)−
1
σ = qa(s
t) (2.3)
(1− ω)Y (st) 1σ b(st)− 1σ = qb(st), (2.4)
where qa and qb are the prices of the North and South intermediate goods in terms of the North
final consumption-investment good. There are a similar set of conditions for the South.7
There are two assets in fixed supply, which are claims on the profits of the Northern and
Southern intermediate goods firm. In a later section, I consider an extension with bonds. The
supply of equity is normalized to unity and firms are entirely equity financed. In the benchmark
model, firms in any country are owned by three parties: domestic insiders, domestic outsiders, and
foreign outsiders.
2.2 Outsiders
There are two representative outsiders in the model, one a resident of the North and the other
residing in the South. Outsiders in this model closely resemble the representative worker-investor
of a standard IBC model. The Northern outsider’s maximization problem is
max
{C(st),L(st),λNN(st),λNS(st)}
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βtpi(st)U(C(st), L(st)) (2.5)
subject to the period-wise budget constraint
6ω is assumed to be greater than 1
2
to reflect an exogenous preference for domestic intermediates. The correspond-
ing weights for the South are ω∗ = (1− ω) and (1− ω∗) = ω, respectively.
7The real exchange rate between the two countries and North’s terms of trade are e(st) = qa(s
t)
q∗a(st)
= qb(s
t)
q∗
b
(st)
and
t(st) = qb(s
t)
qa(st)
by the law of one price for the traded intermediate goods.
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C(st) + P (st)(λNN (s
t)− λNN (st−1)) + e(st)P ∗(st)(λNS(st)− λNS(st−1))
= qa(s
t)W (st)L(st) + λNN (s
t−1)D(st) + λNS(st−1)e(st)D∗(st),
(2.6)
where {C(st), L(st), λNN (st), λNS(st)}∞0 are aggregate consumption, labor supply, and holdings of
the Northern and Southern equity indices respectively. P (P ∗) denotes the North (South) stock
price, D (D∗) the North (South) intermediate good firm’s dividend, W the North wage, and e the
real exchange rate between the North and South. Utility in the benchmark case is assumed to be
U(C,L) = C
1−γ
1−γ +
µL1+ψ
1+ψ , where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion,
1
ψ is the Frisch labor
supply elasticity, and µ < 0.
The Northern outsider has the following optimality conditions for stock purchases
P (st) = β
∑
st+1∈S
pi(st+1|st)UC(s
t, st+1)
UC(st)
(
D(st, st+1) + P (s
t, st+1)
)
(2.7)
e(st)P ∗(st) = β
∑
st+1
pi(st+1|st)UC(s
t, st+1)
UC(st)
e(st, st+1)
(
D∗(st, st+1) + P ∗(st, st+1)
)
. (2.8)
The condition for hours worked is
UC(s
t)qa(s
t)W (st) + UL(s
t) = 0 (2.9)
There is a similar set of conditions for the South.
2.3 Insiders
Firms in this model are partially owned and entirely controlled by insiders. I assume for the moment
that the insider owns an exogenously given fraction α of the firm’s equity. This is done for two
reasons. First, it turns out that most of the economic insights regarding the determinants of outsider
portfolios are independent of α. Second, the derivation of analytical portfolio solutions for outsiders
are greatly simplified if one assumes the amount of insider equity to be fixed. The endogenous
determination of α is postponed till Section 2.7, where I show using numerical simulations that
insider ownership depends on institutional quality. Institutional quality in the model is measured
by a parameter η, which shall be defined shortly. Thus, one can think of insider ownership as
α = F (η), where F : η → α is a mapping from institutional quality to insider ownership. Though I
suppress this implicit dependence to keep the notation simple, the reader should keep this aspect
in mind when interpreting the results presented.
The Northern insider has the following period-wise flow of income:
M(st) = αD(st) + qa(s
t)f(st)Ya(s
t)− Φ(st), (2.10)
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where α is the insider’s ownership of cash flow rights, f is the fraction of revenue extracted as
private benefits of control, Φ is the deadweight cost incurred by the insider to extract private
benefits, and D are dividends defined by
D(st) = qa(s
t)[{1− f(st)}Ya(st)−W (st)L(st)]− {K(st)− (1− δ)K(st−1)}. (2.11)
The modeling of the agency problem related to private benefits follows Albuquerque and Wang
(2006, 2008), who embed the free cash flow problem of Jensen (1986) in a general equilibrium model
to study the effect of investor protection on macroeconomic aggregates like investment, stock market
volatility, exchange rates and stock prices. There is an extensive literature in corporate finance
documenting the extent and magnitude of private benefits of control, which in reality can take
forms such as outright pilferage of firm assets, product discounts to subsidiaries, or share sales at
low prices to related parties (see Barclay and Holderness, 1989; Nenova, 2003). In this paper, I
abstract from the precise form private benefits might take by modeling it simply as a component of
the insider’s consumption. Dyck and Zingales (2004), estimating private benefits of control around
the world from the premium paid for blocks of controlling shares, find that such benefits average
to around 14% of firm equity value and can be as high as 65% of equity value in countries where
investor protection institutions are weak.
The deadweight cost, Φ, can be thought of as monetary bribes, the costs of running front
companies, doctoring accounts, or paying court-mandated fines in the event of litigation. Following
the finance literature (e.g. Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; Kim and Durnev, 2005), the cost of stealing
is assumed to take a quadratic form
Φ(st) = qa(s
t)
ηf(st)2Ya(s
t)
2
(2.12)
because it simplifies analytical results substantially. Φ depends on a parameter that captures
institutional quality, η. Higher values of η correspond to better institutional quality. Thus I
assume that private benefits of control are easier to extract in countries that suffer from institutional
failures. This is consistent with the empirical evidence in Nenova (2003) and Dyck and Zingales
(2004). Conversely, better institutions make it easier for outside investors to extract the free cash
flow of a firm in the form of dividends, as in LaPorta et al. (2000), and Dittmar et al. (2003).
The value of η can be allowed to differ between the North and the South to reflect differences in
institutional quality.
Since α is fixed, and the insider does not trade in the foreign asset, income and consumption
coincide for the insider. In addition, she does not supply labor. The insider is also assumed to have
sole authority over the hiring and investment decisions of the representative domestic firm. Thus
8
the Northern insider’s maximization problem, for a given level of ownership α, is
max
{I(st),D(st),L(st),f(st)}
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
Q(st)(αD(st) + qa(s
t)f(st)Y (st)− Φ(st)), (2.13)
where Q(st) ≡ pi(st)βt U
′
(M(st))
U ′ (M(s0))
is the stochastic discount factor. It is worth noting here that the
firm’s profits are evaluated using a stochastic discount factor that is a function only of the insider’s
consumption. The set up for the Southern insider, except for possible differences in the institutional
quality parameter in the South, η∗, is identical.
The inter-temporal optimality condition for investment is given by
∑
st+1∈S
Q(st, st+1)
Q(st)
[
θ
(
1 +
(1− α)2
2αη
)qa(st, st+1)Ya(st, st+1)
K(st)
+ (1− δ)] = 1. (2.14)
The static labor demand function is given by
W (st)L(st) = (1− θ)
(
1 +
(1− α)2
2αη
)
Ya(s
t). (2.15)
Optimal private benefits of control are given by
f(st) =
1− α
η
. (2.16)
Insider ownership in the presence of imperfect corporate governance introduces a time-invariant
wedge, (1+ (1−α)
2
2αη ) ≥ 1, in the optimality conditions for investment and labor demand, as compared
to a frictionless model. The effect of this wedge is to push investment and employment beyond
the frictionless optimal level. To see this, first note that θqaYaK in condition (2.14) above is the
marginal product of capital in terms of the final good. Since this is multiplied by the wedge, the
agency friction makes the insider place a higher weight on the payoff from capital than she would
in a frictionless world. This increases the incentive to invest. Similarly, condition (2.15) shows that
the wedge increases the total employment bill. The intuition for these effects is as follows. The
wedge in the two optimality conditions is essentially the insider’s gross payoff (before deducting
the insider’s share of labor and investment costs) from dividends and private benefits of control
(net costs of extracting that benefit) as a share of the insider’s ownership of the total revenue
stream.8 Due to the presence of private benefits, this payoff is higher the weaker is the quality
of domestic institutions (lower η). Thus weak institutions lead to empire building in the form of
higher investment and employment. These properties of the model are summarized in Proposition
1.
8Suppressing the state notation, the gross payoff referred to is
α(1−f)qaYa+(f− ηf
2
2
)qaYa
αqaYa
. Using the optimal f = 1−α
η
and simplifying yields the expression for the wedge.
9
Proposition 1 The agency friction introduces a time-invariant wedge, (1 + (1−α)
2
2αη ), in the opti-
mality condition for investment and labor that: (i) decreases with better institutional quality (higher
η); (ii) increases the weight placed by the insider on the marginal product of capital; (iii) increases
labor’s share of output.
Proof: Follows from inspection of the first order conditions (2.14) and (2.15). 
Plugging in the optimal amount of private benefit to find revenues net of stealing, we get
(ψ1 − ψ0) as capital’s share of output, where ψ1 ≡ (1 − 1−αη ) is the share of gross revenues (net
of private benefits) in output, and ψ0 ≡ (1 − θ)(1 + (1−α)
2
2αη ) is labor’s share. Note that labor’s
and capital’s share in GDP add up to ψ1 ≤ 1 because of private benefits of control. ψ1 = 1 when
institutions are perfect.
This completes the description of the main elements of the model. The market clearing condi-
tions and the definition of equilibrium are reported in an online appendix for brevity.
2.4 Insider Ownership and Investment Dynamics
This section shows how insider ownership and the agency friction affect the dynamics of investment.
First, it is useful to break up the insider’s consumption M(st) into three components,
αD(st)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Insider′s share of dividends
+qa(s
t)f(st)Ya(s
t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Private benefits
−Φ(st)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of stealing
,
where dividends D(st) are defined by
qa(s
t)
(
1− f(st))Ya(st)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue net of private benefit
−qa(st)W (st)L(st)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Labor costs
−{K(st)− (1− δ)K(st−1)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Investment
.
The agency problem in the model stems from the insider’s limited ownership of the firm and her
ability to extract private benefits of control. Because the insider owns only a fraction α of the
firm, in effect (1 − α) of her private benefits come from the revenue stream owned by outsiders.
The larger the share (1− α) owned by outsiders, the greater the insider’s incentive to steal. Thus,
the optimal extraction of private benefits of control declines with greater insider ownership and
increases with greater outsider ownership as in Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) and Albuquerque
and Wang (2006, 2008), as shown by the insider’s optimality condition (2.16)
f(st) =
1− α
η
.
Multiplying the expression for dividends by the insider’s ownership share α and inspecting the
last two terms, we see that the insider pays for only a fraction α of the labor and investment cost
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of the firm due to her limited ownership.
−α{qa(st)W (st)L(st)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Insider′s share of labor costs
−α{K(st)− (1− δ)K(st−1)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Insider′s share of investment costs
Since private benefits are proportional to firm size by assumption and the higher costs of a larger
firm are partly subsidized by outside owners, the insider has an incentive to over-invest and over-
employ. This distinguishes the agency aspect of the model from Albuquerque and Wang (2008),
who focus only on over-investment. Ceteris paribus, the imperfect substitutability of capital and
labor leads to higher equilibrium capital stock as well as greater demand for labor compared to an
environment without corporate governance frictions.9
For symmetric countries, the steady state capital-output ratio and investment-output ratio are
respectively θφ1
β
+δ−1 and
δθφ
1
β
+δ−1 , where φ ≡ (1 +
(1−α)2
2αη ), the corporate governance driven wedge
introduced in Proposition 1, is higher when institutions are weaker. We cannot solve for equilib-
rium non-steady-state investment rates in closed form in a discrete time framework.10 However,
expanding the investment optimality condition in terms of its first and second moments as
Et
(Qt+1
Qt
)
[θφEt
(qat+1Yat
Kt
)
+ (1− δ)] = 1− θφCovt
(qat+1Yat
Kt
,
Qt+1
Qt
)
,
gives us some intuition. The covariance term on the right-hand side of the expression is negative
since the insider is non-diversified. This, ceteris paribus, leads to a lower stock of capital, that
is, makes the insider reluctant to over-invest when η is lower. Since the insider is risk averse and
her consumption stream is derived entirely from the firm, over-investment reduces her utility by
increasing the volatility of her consumption stream. However, the first order effect is the incentive
to over-invest which can be seen in the term for the expected returns to investment θφEt
(
qat+1Yat
Kt
)
.
Weaker institutions increase this incentive.
2.5 Analytical Solutions for Outsider Portfolios
The previous section outlined the intuition for insider over-investment in countries with weaker
institutions. In this section I demonstrate that the general equilibrium effects of the insider’s
decision on outsider portfolios is to make them biased towards domestic assets. In order to do so,
I follow Heathcote and Perri (2004, 2013) in making a number of simplifying assumptions to solve
for outsider portfolios analytically.
9This implication of the model may seem counter-intuitive at face value. But note that the claim here is that the
South will have higher per capita capital stock only when its productivity is the same as the North. Albuquerque and
Wang (2008) provide cross-country evidence of higher investment rates in countries with lower corporate governance
standards. Also, there is a wealth of anecdotal evidence of over-investment by poorly governed firms in Asia leading
up to the 1997-1998 crisis.
10Albuquerque and Wang (2008) derive a closed form expression for the investment rate in a continuous time
framework and show that investment rates increase with weaker investor protection.
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It is assumed that North and South are ex-ante symmetric (η = η∗ and α = α∗), and that the
utility of outsiders is logarithmic in consumption (γ = 1). The final goods technology that combines
Northern and Southern intermediates is also assumed to be Cobb-Douglas (σ = 1). Under these
conditions, a constant portfolio rule that replicates the complete markets outcome for outsiders
exists.11 Proposition 2 below provides intuition for the results of the numerical simulations that
follow and highlights the main qualitative mechanisms at work. The more interesting and relevant
case of two countries with different institutional quality is explored numerically.12 The solution in
Proposition 2 can be thought of as equity positions that decentralize a central planner’s problem
that maximizes the equally weighted sum of outsider utilities, given optimal behavior by the insiders
in each country.13
Proposition 2 There exists an equilibrium for this economy with own-country portfolio share for
outsiders, λNN = λSS = λ, such that the consumptions of outside investors are equated across
symmetric countries in all states of nature. The value of λ is given by
λ = (1− α)
[1
2
+
1
2
{ ψ0(2ω − 1)
1− (1− ψ0)(2ω − 1)}
]
, (2.17)
where
ψ0 = (1− θ)φ
is labor’s share of total income, and φ ≡ (1 + (1−α)22αη ), is the gross payoff per share to the insider.
The degree of home bias, given by 12{ ψ0(2ω−1)1−(1−ψ0)(2ω−1)}, is decreasing in institutional quality.
Proof: It can be shown that under the allocations implied by this portfolio rule, all equilibrium
conditions of the model are satisfied. See appendix A.1. 
Proposition 2 gives us insights and testable predictions about two determinants of international
diversification that have so far remained unexplored in the IBC framework. The first piece in the
solution, 1−α2 , is the minimum-variance portfolio used for pure diversification. Since only a fraction
(1 − α) of the world market portfolio is part of the float, each representative outsider holds 1−α2
by symmetry. The first insight from Proposition 2 is that the float portfolio should play a major
role in determining a country’s diversification potential. The smaller the float portfolio, the less
internationally diversified a country will be.
11Since γ = 1 and σ = 1, the condition γσ = 1 needed for the replicability of the complete markets outcome with
only equities discussed on page 364 of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) holds.
12This problem, due to the ex-ante asymmetry of the countries in question, cannot be solved by the simple algebra
used in this section.
13Note that the solution for λ below represents the fraction of the domestic firm owned by the domestic agent, as
well as the fraction of domestic wealth invested in domestic assets. This is true because of the ex-ante symmetry of
the countries assumed in this section, and will not be true in general.
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The second piece, 12{ ψ0(2ω−1)(1−α)1−(1−ψ0)(2ω−1)}, hedges against labor-income risk. The size of this portion
of the portfolio increases when institutional quality is lower. The literature, since the seminal
work of Cole and Obstfeld (1991), has only focused on trade openness as a determinant of the
hedge portfolio. What Proposition 2 highlights is that two other factors, the float portfolio and
institutional quality (via the hedge portfolio), are also at play.14 The empirical importance of these
two factors is explored later in Section 3.
2.5.1 The Hedge Portfolio
To get further insight about the macroeconomic channels through which the hedge portfolio works,
the portfolio in Proposition 2 is now expressed in terms of the first and second moments of a few
key endogenous variables.
Proposition 3 The portfolio λ can be expressed as
λ ≈ (1− α)
[1
2
− 1
2
ΨR
]
,
where
Ψ =
L¯
D¯(1− α) =
ψ0(1− θ)( 1β + δ − 1)
(1− α)[(1− θ)(ψ1 − ψ0)( 1β + δ − 1)− ψ0δθ]
and
Cov(∆Lˆ,∆Dˆ)
Var(∆Dˆ)
≡ R ≈ −
(1− α)(2ω − 1){(1− θ)(ψ1 − ψ0)( 1β + δ − 1)− ψ0δθ}
(1− θ)( 1β + δ − 1){1− (1− ψ0)(2ω − 1)}
.
Here L = qaWL = Labor income, D = Dividends, ∆Lˆ = Lˆ− eˆ− Lˆ∗, ∆Dˆ = Dˆ − eˆ− Dˆ∗.15
Proof: See appendix A.1. 
The expression for the hedge portfolio in Proposition 3 gives us much more insight into the
channels at work.16 It is determined by the product of two quantities. The first is the relative
importance of labor income compared to dividend income for outside investors in the steady state,
given by the ratio Ψ = L¯
D¯(1−α) . As noted before in Proposition 1, weaker institutions make this
14The portfolio in Proposition 2 approaches the equity portfolio in Heathcote and Perri (2013) and Coeurdacier
et al. (2010) when three conditions are satisfied: (i) institutional quality in both countries is perfect; (ii) insider
ownership in both countries is very close to zero; (iii) there is perfect alignment of interests between the insider and
the outsider, in the sense that the insider uses a weighted average of discount factors of the firm’s owners to value
the stream of dividends. Under these conditions, it converges to λ = ω+θ−2ωθ
1+θ−2ωθ .
15Hats over variables denote log deviations from symmetric steady state values and bars above variables denote
symmetric steady state values.
16As emphasized by Heathcote and Perri (2013), the portfolio can be expressed in terms of the covariance between
different components of income across the two countries because of the no-trade result implicit in Proposition 2.
With no trade in assets in equilibrium, asset income derives only from dividends and not from realized capital gains
or losses. Thus asset income rather than asset returns determines portfolios.
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ratio higher both through a higher labor share of GDP caused by inefficient firm sizes, and through a
lower dividend share of GDP caused by private benefit extraction and steady state over-investment.
Higher L¯
D¯(1−α) , on average, increases the need to hedge labor income risk, thereby making any asset
that does so more attractive to outsiders.
This asset turns out to be the domestic portfolio because of the second component in the hedge
portfolio, Cov(∆Lˆ,∆Dˆ)
Var(∆Dˆ)
. Note that Cov(∆Lˆ,∆Dˆ)
Var(∆Dˆ)
is negative whenever countries have a preference for
the domestic intermediate good in their final consumption bundle, so that ω > 12 . That this is a
generic feature of models based on the BKK framework (Backus et al., 1995) is well known in the
literature (see Coeurdacier et al., 2010; Heathcote and Perri, 2013). The same forces are at work in
this model. However, the presence of the insider amplifies the connection between investment and
the two income streams of outside investors. The key mechanism at work is the sharper response
of investment following shocks due to ‘empire-building’ by insiders, and the effect this has on terms
of trade movements following shocks. Since, ceteris paribus, higher investment improves the terms
of trade by increasing the demand for the domestic intermediate good following a good shock, the
presence of insiders amplifies this improvement. What effect does this have on outsider incomes?
Consider labor income first. The worsening of the terms of trade after a good shock tended to
have a cross border insurance effect by lowering the divergence between the value of domestic and
foreign labor income, which is dampened by the presence of investment as shown by Heathcote
and Perri (2013). Since this dampening effect is even stronger in my model, relative labor income
rises by more. Following the shock, higher investment also leads domestic dividends to decline by
more than in a frictionless model. Overall, the presence of the insider thus increases the negative
correlation between labor and asset income generic to this class of models. This is the main insight
summarized in Proposition 3. Section 3 tests these predictions about diversification and the ratio
R empirically, finding evidence consistent with R being the ‘missing link’ between capital flows and
institutions.
Propositions 2 and 3 assume institutionally symmetric countries and thus work through the
magnification of the terms of trade effects generic to this class of models, and the higher labor
shares in both countries. They are useful mainly because analytical solutions are able to identify
the channels through which home bias works in this model. They are also instructive when thinking
about the cross holdings we might expect in a world where all countries have similar, but variable
institutional quality.17 It is also useful when conducting the comparative static exercise of raising (or
lowering) institutional quality simultaneously in two countries that have bilateral equity positions.
They cannot shed light on the magnitude of the institutional quality channel when η 6= η∗.
17For example, it suggests that we should observe greater cross holdings between the US and Germany than between
India and Thailand. This prediction should however be interpreted with caution since it comes from a two country
model where there are no effects from the presence of a third bloc of countries which may have different institutional
quality.
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But the model has a channel by which relative labor and asset income are negatively correlated,
independent of terms of trade effects when countries are asymmetric. Following a positive tech-
nology shock in the South, relative labor and income goes up, and relative dividend income goes
down driven by relative over-investment in the South. In the special case where we are able to solve
for portfolios analytically, this channel is eliminated completely because η = η∗ and these relative
quantities move identically. All theories of home-biased portfolios assume some form of country
asymmetry. For example, the terms of trade effects described in Heathcote and Perri (2013) and
utilized in this section are driven by home bias in final goods (ω > 12). Thus exploring country
heterogeneity in institutional quality is interesting because we can expect to find large quantita-
tive effects driven by institutional asymmetry. Section 2.6 presents results from solving the model
numerically for the case when η 6= η∗.
The reader may wonder if the analytical results in Propositions 2 and 3 are robust to the
inclusion of bond trade. I consider in the appendix (Section A.1) a straightforward extension of the
baseline case, that allows outsiders to trade in bonds in addition to equity. The main conclusion
from this exercise is that the equity portfolio remains unchanged by the inclusion of bonds, a finding
similar to Coeurdacier et al. (2010).
2.6 Portfolios with Heterogeneous Institutions
The time-invariant portfolio derived in the previous sections rested on country symmetry, and needs
to be solved for numerically when countries differ in institutional quality. For this I numerically
implement a variant of the fixed-point procedure used in Devereux and Sutherland (2011) and Tille
and Van Wincoop (2010). I describe this procedure in detail in the appendix.18 Sample Matlab R©
files used to implement this procedure are available on the author’s webpage.
The time period of the model is a quarter. Most of the parameter values for the benchmark
model are taken from Heathcote and Perri (2013). The discount rate is β = 0.99, capital’s share of
18In short, I find Taylor-series approximations of the optimal decision rules for the control variables and the
transition equations of the endogenous state variables using the algorithms provided in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2004), choosing the non-stochastic steady-state of the model as the approximation point for non-portfolio variables.
As is well-known, steady state or zero-order portfolio shares cannot be solved for using the same non-stochastic or
zero-order steady-state equations that are utilized for finding the steady state for non-portfolio variables. Instead,
second-order approximations of the portfolio Euler equations along with first-order approximations of other model
equations are necessary to capture the effect of uncertainty. The steady state of the portfolio variables are found by
making a guess for these and then using an iterative procedure to verify that a key optimality condition holds up to
a second-order approximation. In particular, I verify if Et[γ(Rˆx,t+1− eˆt+1)(Cˆ∗t+1− Cˆt+1) + eˆt+1Rˆx,t+1− eˆ2t+1] <  for
some suitably small . This condition is evaluated in practice by using only the first-order component of the decision
rules for non-portfolio variables, because these depend only on the zero-order portfolio. The procedure is validated
by confirming that in the special case where Proposition 2 holds, it converges to the known analytical solution from
any arbitrary initial guess, with minimal error in the optimality condition (of the order of 10−18). I also apply this
procedure to a number of other cases when closed-form and exact analytical solution for portfolios do not exist (σ 6= 1
or γ 6= 1). A graph of the errors in the optimality condition derived from the model’s asset Euler equations in one such
case was provided in the appendix of an earlier working paper version, showing that there exists a unique portfolio
share at which the expression is minimized.
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output is θ = 0.34, and depreciation is δ = 0.025. The import share is set at 0.15 and the weight ω
of home intermediate goods in the aggregating function is calibrated accordingly. The benchmark
case assumes that the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign intermediate good, σ,
and the coefficient of relative risk aversion for the outsider, γ, are both 1.19 The weight on labor
in the additive disutility function, µ, is adjusted so that the fraction of time spent working is 0.3.
The exponent of labor in this function, ψ, is set to 1. The insider is assumed to have logarithmic
utility in consumption only. Technology in both countries is assumed to follow an AR(1) process
with an autocorrelation coefficient of 0.91, while the standard deviation of the technology shock in
the North is set to 0.006. There are no contemporaneous or lagged spillover effects.
The idea here is to see if the model can generate realistic magnitudes of outsider home bias
for the median (in terms of institutional quality and insider ownership) country. Since this is a
two-country model, I think of institutional heterogeneity in the following simple way. Institutional
quality in the North is assumed to be perfect (η = 106), and North insider ownership is set to the
value for the United States (α = 12.35%), the lowest insider ownership in the Kho et al. (2009)
sample. The corresponding values for the South are η∗ = 160 and α∗ = 51%, which reflect the
institutional quality and insider ownership in the median country in the following sense: the value
of α∗ = 51% is simply the median insider ownership in the Kho et al. (2009) sample, while the
value of the institutional quality parameter (η∗ = 160) is calibrated to match the optimal level of
private benefits of control in the median country (approximately 8% of firm value) when α∗ = 51%.
The equilibrium shares of foreign and domestic assets in the wealth of each country’s outsider are
computed by the procedure described before.
As noted at the beginning of Section 2.3, insider ownership is determined by institutional quality
but has been treated as being exogenous when calculating optimal outsider portfolios. Thus one
last relevant detail for this calibration method is whether the insider ownership values used above
are optimal for the calibrated values of the other parameters. I show in the next section, where I
extend the model to make insider ownership in the South a choice variable for the South insider,
that this is indeed the case when the standard deviation of the technology shock in the South is
set to σ∗ = 1.75× 0.006. For this value of σ∗ , the South insider finds it optimal to own α∗ = 51%
of South equity when η∗ = 160. The choice of the precise value of σ∗ = 1.75× 0.006 is explained
in detail in the next section. All the parameter values used for the simulations in this section are
summarized in Table 4 in the appendix.
The model replicates the degree of home bias seen in the median country closely. In the
benchmark calibration described above, the share of foreign assets in wealth for the median country
19I verify that one can solve for the zero-order portfolio using alternative values of σ and γ. Heathcote and Perri
(2013), in a similar model, simulate portfolios under varying final goods production technology and utility functions
using different values of the elasticity of substitution σ between intermediate goods, and the coefficient of relative risk
aversion γ. They find that for the range of values for these parameters used in the macro literature, the mechanism
underlying Propositions 2 and 3 remains intact.
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is found to be 21.71%, which is close to the median foreign asset share in the data, which is 22.9%.20
The share of wealth held in foreign assets by the South insider is 29%. Foreign and domestic assets
make up 10% and 90% of the wealth of the outsider in the median country. The North has wealth
shares in the foreign and domestic assets of 14% and 86%.21 I postpone a more complete comparison
of the predictions of the model to the empirical distribution of international diversification in a cross
section of countries till Section 3. I also explore the quantitative aspects of the hedging channel
underlying outsider portfolios in that section.
Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions with Heterogenous Institutions.
Notes: Impulse response of dividend income and labor income in two alternative scenarios.
Panels (A) and (B) – high and low institutional quality in North and South respectively. Panels
(C) and (D) – both countries have high institutional quality.
As discussed earlier, the macroeconomic mechanism underlying this effect originates in the dy-
namics of dividends and labor income following technology shocks. The impulse response functions
(IRFs) in Figure 2 plot the time path of these variables after a simultaneous 1 percent increase in
productivity in both countries. To emphasize visually the difference that weak investor protection
makes to the IRFs, panels (A) and (B) depict the situation when the North has perfect institutions
and the South has institutional quality in the lowest decile, while panels (C) and (D) correspond
to both countries having perfect institutional quality. In panel (B), dividends decline on impact in
20The median country here refers to the median country in the distribution of private benefits of control for a
sample of 21 countries. The details of this comparison are clarified in a following section.
21The overall wealth share of 21.71% for the median country is the weighted average of the portfolio shares of the
insider and the outsider, with weights 0.748 and 0.252 corresponding to the starting levels of insider ownership in the
South. This initial distribution is explained in a later section.
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the South while in panel (D) they increase. In both panels (A) and (B) labor income goes up on
impact. Thus dividend and labor income move in opposite directions in the South in the period
of the shock, driving the Southern preference for domestic assets. Section 3 tests this mechanism
using data on international macroeconomic aggregates.
2.7 Explaining Concentrated Ownership
The intuition as to why insider ownership in the South is high hinges on two forces in the model.
On the one hand, the insider being risk-averse desires to diversify internationally by lowering
her ownership stake. However, lower ownership increases her incentive to extract private benefits
of control. This reduces expected dividends for outsiders, thus lowering the market value of the
domestic index. Outside investors take this into account, and hence are only willing to trade with the
insider at lower prices for her holdings.22 This is the second force at work, an endogenous market-
determined “transaction tax” on portfolio adjustments by insiders that penalizes diversification. In
countries with low institutional quality, the second force dominates the first, leading to high insider
ownership.
I explore this effect quantitatively by enriching the asymmetric model with an analysis of the
portfolio decision of the insider. In order to maintain tractability, I make a number of simplifying
assumptions. First, I focus only on the insider’s problem in the South while maintaining a fixed
(low) level of insider ownership in the North.23 This reduces the computational burden of finding an
equilibrium considerably while answering the crucial question as to what causes high and persistent
insider ownership in Southern countries. The second assumption is that the Southern insider trades
in equity only once during the horizon of the model. This is a reasonable simplification in the light
of two empirical observations. Kho et al. (2009) note that country level insider ownership shows
little time variation. There is also ample evidence that insiders face large fixed costs of trading in
their control blocks because of several factors such as asymmetric information between insiders and
the market (Goldstein and Razin, 2006), price impacts of large share sales because of negatively
sloped demand curve for assets (Shleifer, 1986; Chari and Henry, 2004), and the presence of private
benefits of control (Nenova, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004).
The economy starts at a steady state at t = −1 just prior to t = 0. The insider in the North
owns a fraction α of the local stock market and is assumed to remain passive. Initially, the South
insider owns a fraction α∗−1 of the South stock index and does not hold any foreign (North) assets.
In period t = −1, the Southern insider announces plans to diversify risk by reducing her holdings
of the Southern stock index from α∗−1 to α∗, for all time t = 0 to ∞. Enforceable contracts are
written between the Southern insider and outsiders in each country that she will sell (α∗−1 − α∗)
22Note that the insider takes into consideration the impact of her sale of shares on the price of these shares when
deciding how much to sell. Thus the insider does not act as a price taker as in perfectly competitive markets.
23This is an obvious limitation of the current model. A more complete analysis would make the insider ownership
stakes in both countries endogenous, and is left for future work.
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units of Southern equity and will receive shares in the Northern stock index.
How much of the Northern index the Southern insider receives in exchange for the (α∗−1 − α∗)
units of the Southern index she divests is determined as follows. Since the insider is unable to
commit to a certain level of value-reducing action because of weak corporate governance, the
Southern stock price depends on the final holdings of the insider, α∗, as in Admati et al. (1994)
and DeMarzo and Urosˇevic´ (2006), rather than the initial holdings α∗−1. Thus, trade between the
Southern insider and outsiders takes place at the real exchange rate and stock prices that prevail
in the steady state corresponding to the final allocation of ownership. In period 0, as agreed in
the previous period’s contract, αSN =
essP ∗ss(α∗)
P ss(α)
(
α∗−1−α∗
)
units of the Northern stock index are
delivered to the Southern insider. Also, trade takes place between outsiders and portfolio holdings
{λNN , λSN , λNS , λSS} are established. Below, I distinguish between the generic holdings of South
and North equity by the South insider, which are denoted as α˜∗ and α˜SN , from the optimal holdings,
which are labeled α∗ and αSN .
The Southern insider takes into account the effect her final holding has on the stock price,
and consequently, her wealth, when she announces her optimal holdings α∗ for the rest of time.
Formally, at t = −1 she chooses α∗ from a range of possible values α˜∗ to maximize her discounted
lifetime utility:
α∗ = argmaxα˜∗{V (α˜∗, ·)}, (2.18)
where
V (α˜∗) = max
{I∗, D∗, L∗, f∗}
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
Q∗(st)
(
α˜∗D∗(st) + qb(st)f∗(st)Yb(st)− Φ∗(st) + ˜αSND(s
t)
e(st)
)
comes from the second stage (from t = 0, 1, ...,∞) maximization problem of the insider that takes
α˜∗ as given, and ˜αSN =
essP ∗ss(α˜∗)
P ss(α)
(
α∗−1 − α˜∗
)
. I evaluate the function V for a fine grid of insider
ownership stakes α˜∗ by simulating the model for 110,000 periods, discard the first 10,000 periods
to purge the resultant series of the effects of initial conditions, and then calculate the discounted
sum of utility over the last 100,000 periods.24 This is done for a fixed value of insider ownership
(α = 0.1235) and institutional quality (η = 106) in the North, the same as in the benchmark
simulations for outsider portfolios before. The initial value of insider ownership in the South, α∗−1,
is taken as 0.748, which is the highest value of mean insider ownership from the Kho et al. (2009)
data.25 Since equity claims to capital are the only assets in the model, the initial insider ownership
determines the distribution of wealth in the South between insiders and outsider.
The model is calibrated for the purposes of this simulation as follows. I choose the institutional
24Second-order approximations of the optimal decision rules are used for calculating the discounted sum of utility
of the insider. More details of the steps used are provided in the appendix. Kim and Kim (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2004) show that this method provides an accurate evaluation of welfare in IBC models under different
levels of diversification.
25The mean value weighted insider ownership in Argentina is 74.8% of the stock market.
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quality parameter in the South η∗ to target the median level of the block premium data Dyck
and Zingales (2004). At the benchmark value of the standard deviation of the underlying shock
the model predicts that the insider has no gains from international diversification.26 Since this
value is the Heathcote and Perri (2013) estimate for a group of developed economies, it very likely
underestimates the level of volatility faced by the typical South country. Indeed, I find that at
higher values of the standard deviation of the shock, the South insider gains from international
diversification and that the gain from diversification is increasing in the volatility of the Southern
driving process. Thus I choose the standard deviation of the South driving shock to match the
insider ownership of the median Southern country. The chosen standard deviation of 1.75 times
the baseline value of 0.006 is well within the range of volatility that the literature has estimated
for emerging market economies. For example, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) report a mean output
volatility in a group of emerging market economies of 2.74 compared to 1.34 for a group of developed
economies, with a high of 4.35 for Thailand compared to a low of 0.89 for Austria.27
Once the shock volatility has been fixed to target the median insider ownership in the data, I
vary the institutional quality parameter η∗ to match the block premia of the countries at the 10th,
25th, 75th, and 90th percentile of the distribution of block premia. The optimal insider ownership
chosen by the insider is computed numerically by the process described earlier for each of these
values of institutional quality in the South.28 The results, shown in Table 1 below, are qualitatively
consistent with the data: as predicted by the intuition presented before, insider ownership goes
down with better institutional quality. It should be kept in mind while interpreting this table that
higher block premia correspond to a lower quality of institutions. It is interesting to note that at the
calibrated level of volatility, once the quality of institutions decreases beyond the 75th percentile
of the block premium (higher block premium = lower institutional quality), the lifetime utility loss
from lowering ownership always outweighs the gain from diversification. Hence for the 75th and
90th percentiles of block premia, the model predicts that insiders prefer to not trade away from
their endowment of 74.8 % of the domestic index. To get a better sense of the quantitative success
of the model, I compare these predicted numbers to the data on insider ownership in Section 3.
A small caveat about the asset market structure is in order here. Note that the insider is not
allowed to hold any safe assets in the model. This artificially limits the vehicles that are available
for the insider to diversify risk to only foreign assets. It is very likely that the outsider would
26An earlier draft of this paper showed that the utility of the insider declined sharply when she diversified due to
the small gains from international diversification and the large losses due to the “transaction tax” effect described
earlier.
27I also verify that for the levels of risk considered, the outsiders’ optimal zero-order portfolios are not affected. The
reason is that the process of finding these optimal portfolios, as detailed before, involves the numerical evaluation of
the second-order-accurate Euler equations for outsiders using only first-order approximations of the optimal decision
rules of the model’s variables (see Tille and Van Wincoop, 2010; Devereux and Sutherland, 2011). These first-
order approximations are independent of risk for small perturbations of risk around the zero-risk steady state (see
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2004, for details). As a result, the optimal zero-order outsider portfolios are not affected.
28Note that the volatility parameter and η can be varied jointly to match any level of insider ownership and private
benefits.
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Table 1: Predicted Insider Ownership.
Block Premium Percentile Insider Ownership
10 11%
25 21%
50 51%
75 75%
90 75%
Notes: The model is calibrated to target insider ownership in the country corresponding to the
50th percentile (in bold above) of the block premium in Dyck and Zingales (2004).
wish to diversify and hold safe assets, thus leading to an increase in the float portfolio without
concurrent increases in foreign asset holdings if local outsiders were willing to exchange firm equity
for safe assets. While this is a very interesting possibility, it would make the two-country portfolio
allocation problem quite intractable with four agents and multiple assets. I thus view this as an
interesting direction for future research, perhaps in an otherwise simplified framework.29
The insight that the portfolio of large shareholders is determined by their interaction with
outside shareholders has long existed in the finance literature, exemplified by Admati et al. (1994)
and DeMarzo and Urosˇevic´ (2006). Both these papers study the asset allocation problem of a large
shareholder who can affect the mean and volatility of security returns by expending costly private
effort on monitoring.30 Effort being costly, the incentive to monitor comes from ownership of cash
flow rights. Since the outsider can anticipate the rational choice of effort of the insider conditional
on her ownership stake in the firm, the insider finds it costly to sell her shares: any reduction in
stake, via a reduction in the incentive compatible level of monitoring effort, leads to a drop in share
prices paid by the representative small investor. Admati et al. (1994) refer to this as a ‘transaction
tax’, a phrase I borrow. However, their setup is closed-economy and partial-equilibrium. The
present paper, to best of my knowledge, is the first showing that this insight is also applicable to
the determination of country-level insider ownership, and hence international capital flows.
3 Model Versus Data
The model has predictions about two distinct quantities: the amount of insider ownership and
the fraction of outsider wealth invested in foreign assets, and for the latter, two channels – the
labor-dividend ratio and the covariance ratio channels. The numerical simulations in Section 2.7
29I thank an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this.
30Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) also show that better investor protection leads to more diffuse ownership of assets
in a static, risk-neutral framework.
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show that insider ownership is negatively related to the quality of investor protection institutions.
Proposition 2 and the numerical simulations in Section 2.6 show that the fraction of outsider
wealth invested in foreign assets should, conditional on insider ownership, depend positively on
institutional quality. Proposition 3 suggests that the channel behind this result rests on the first
and second moments of relative labor income and relative dividend income, and the latter in turn
should depend on institutional quality through general equilibrium effects.
I proceed as follows in this section. I describe the data and its construction in Section 3.1.
In Section 3.2 I verify that the stylized fact motivating the paper holds up to a simple regression
analysis. Then I compare the predictions of the model regarding insider ownership and outsider
portfolios to the data in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. I also explore the two channels responsible for the
hedging demand in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5 I provide a breakup of the empirical variation in
diversification among the insider ownership, labor-dividend ratio, and covariance ratio channels.
3.1 Data Sources and Construction
In all the results that follow, I use the investor protection indices from LaPorta et al. (1998)
as the measure of institutional quality, but the results remain unchanged with the more general
Kaufmann et al. (2008) indices. Macroeconomic series such as GDP, gross fixed capital formation,
per capita GDP, export and imports, domestic credit and nominal exchange are from WorldBank
(2008). Financial openness is measured by the index detailed in Chinn and Ito (2008), and insider
ownership is measured by the value-weighted fraction of market capitalization closely held from Kho
et al. (2009). Cross country estimates of private benefits of control are from Dyck and Zingales
(2004).
Foreign equity asset holdings are measured by the ratio of foreign equity assets to country
wealth. I focus on portfolio equity and foreign direct investment as these financial claims have
explicit equity attached to them, unlike debt, and thus correspond more closely to the structure of
the model. The foreign assets data is from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) while country wealth is
computed as: W = K+FA−FL, where K is the value of the domestic capital stock, FA is foreign
equity assets and FL foreign equity liabilities. The value of the capital stock is computed using
the perpetual inventory method from country specific investment data following the methodology
detailed in Heathcote and Perri (2013). Our measure of the fraction of wealth allocated to foreign
assets is then simply FAW .
31 The sample period is 1980-2007 as in Heathcote and Perri (2013).32
To test Proposition 3, broad measures of dividend and labor income for each country in the
sample are constructed following the procedure in Heathcote and Perri (2013).33 I use capital’s
31Normalizing by GDP instead of W yields similar results.
32The starting year of 1980 is motivated by large changes in a number of critical financial parameters such as the
degree of financial openness and the rates of capital taxation starting in the early 80s. An earlier version of the paper
used a longer sample period starting in 1970 and found similar results.
33The lack of comparable and reliable data on different labor income components and asset returns for a large enough
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share of GDP minus domestic fixed capital formation, i.e., θ×GDP−Fixed Capital Formation, as
a proxy for dividend income, and labor’s share of GDP, i.e., (1 − θ) × GDP, as a proxy for labor
income. The share of labor in GDP is the same as the calibration in the model. The quantity
series from the World Development Indicators are PPP adjusted in current prices and expressed
in current US Dollars. Hence, they correspond precisely with the real quantities defined. I use a
sample of 21 countries for the years 1980-2007.34 Taking each country i as the baseline, I construct
dividend income and labor income for the rest of the world by weighting each country j 6= i in the
sample with its share of “world” GDP, where “world” denotes the sum of all j 6= i. Next I construct
the nominal exchange rate between a country and the rest of the world by the same procedure,
both GDP weighting and trade weighting the bilateral exchange rates to arrive at a measure of
exchange rates for each country versus the rest of the world. I show results with the GDP weights
but trade weighting leads to similar results.
The next step is to regress the relative dividend earnings and relative labor earnings on nominal
exchange rates and take the residuals of this regression. This residual can be interpreted as that
component of relative labor and capital income variability that cannot be diversified using bonds.
Indeed, I show in the appendix (see Section A.1.4) that the appropriate covariance ratio uses
the residuals from a projection of the relative labor income and dividends on the real exchange
rate. The paper reports results that use nominal exchange rates to construct the residuals, for
comparability to Heathcote and Perri (2013). However, the results remain unchanged when using
the real exchange rate.35 The residuals so estimated are then used to determine the covariance-
variance ratio Ri = Cov(∆Lˆi,∆Dˆi)Var(∆Dˆi) in Proposition 3 for each country i in the sample.
36 In terms of my
model, using residuals has the effect of purging the labor and dividend income of risk factors related
to international relative prices, risks that can be hedged using a variety of alternative instruments
cross section of countries motivates this simplification. Hence the methodology adopted here follows Heathcote and
Perri (2013) in utilizing broad macro aggregates, for which the data burden is less onerous. Papers such as Coeurdacier
and Gourinchas (2012), using more accurate measures of labor and capital income, find similar results for a smaller
set of countries with relatively homogenous institutional quality.
34The sample of countries is smaller than the one used for Figure 1 for the following reasons: (a) fixed capital
formation data is unavailable for some countries; (b) I conduct the analysis on the data in logarithms. For the
logarithmic series, the analysis is possible only for a subset of countries for which dividend income, as calculated, do
not take negative values; (c) the remaining sample is the intersection of conditions (a) and (b) with the availability
of block premia and insider ownership data from Dyck and Zingales (2004) and Kho et al. (2009) respectively. The
precise sample is listed in the appendix.
35This is not surprising since most of the volatility of real exchange rates is driven by fluctuations of nominal rates
(see Chari et al., 2002, for example).
36There are a number of papers showing that using residuals instead of the raw covariance ratio is crucial. In
the appendix to their paper, Heathcote and Perri (2013) provide a simplified model with a forward foreign exchange
market showing that the relevant covariance ratio for evaluating this class of models uses the residuals from a regression
of the covariance ratio on the nominal exchange rate. They also show that this first stage regression is important as
it changes the statistical properties of the covariance ratio significantly. Since bond returns and nominal exchange
rates are highly correlated, this argument is similar to Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2012) who conclude that what
matters for the equity portfolio is the correlation of equity returns and non-financial income conditional on bond
returns. Coeurdacier et al. (2010) also show in a real model with equity and bonds that the relevant covariance ratio
should be calculated on the basis of a regression of the raw dividend and labor income series on the terms of trade.
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such as bonds, or currency forwards markets as in Engel and Matsumoto (2009).
One final issue is the mapping between the institutional quality parameter of the model and
institutional quality as measured in the data. In the model the quality of investor protection
institutions is captured by the parameter η. Since this parameter is unobservable in the data
and only proxied by the LaPorta et al. (1998) index, we need to find an empirically observed or
estimated quantity that maps between the model and the data. Fortunately, the model provides
exactly such a quantity. Net private benefits as a fraction of firm value in the model is given by the
expression
(
f− ηf2
2
)
qaYa
αD =
(1−α2)
2αη
[
(ψ¯1 − ψ¯0)− δ θ1−θ ψ¯01
β
+δ−1
]−1
, which is the premium paid per unit
of stock owned by the insider. Dyck and Zingales (2004) estimates the empirical counterpart of this
quantity, the block premium, from international data on purchase of controlling blocks. It should
be noted however that the mapping between the underlying institutional quality parameter and
the block premium is not perfect: the empirical correlation of the LaPorta et al. (1998) index of
investor protection and the block premium estimates of Dyck and Zingales (2004) is about −0.52.
Thus countries with better investor protection do have lower private benefits of control, but the
correlation between them is not -1. Thus it should be kept in mind while interpreting the model-
data comparisons that follow that the relationship between institutions and a variable of interest
may be partially obscured by the noise introduced by this two-step process.
3.2 Robustness of the Motivating Stylized Fact
The first issue I pursue is to make sure that the stylized fact that motivated the paper — the
positive correlation between foreign asset holdings and institutional quality — is robust beyond the
visual evidence provided in Figure 1. Thus I use OLS regressions (reported in the appendix, Table
3) to control for several factors that have been found to be important in determining international
capital flows (see Dahlquist et al., 2003; Kho et al., 2009; Faria et al., 2007; Coeurdacier, 2008).37
The dependent variable is foreign equity assets (portfolio equity and FDI) as a fraction of country
wealth. Institutional quality, specifically the quality of investor protection measured by the LaPorta
et al. (1998) index, turns out to be positively and statistically significantly correlated (always at
1%) with foreign equity asset holdings after controlling one at a time for country size (GDP), the
level of general development (per capita GDP), openness to trade (share of total trade in GDP),
the level of financial development (domestic credit to GDP ratio), financial openness (using the
index from Chinn and Ito, 2008), insider ownership (fraction of market capitalization closely held),
and an indicator variable for emerging markets (to check if the pattern is driven only by large
differences across developed and emerging markets).38 These results indicate that the correlation
37For the OLS regressions I use a subset of the sample used to construct Figure 1. As explained in the appendix,
this is based on availability of insider ownership data.
38An earlier version of the paper controlled simultaneously for all the variables mentioned and found similar results.
The results (not reported) look similar when using the indices of institutional quality from Kaufmann et al. (2008)
24
depicted in Figure 1 — that countries with weaker institutions hold fewer foreign assets — can be
thought of as a valid stylized fact, and corroborates the findings of others such as Coeurdacier and
Rey (2013).
3.3 Insider Ownership: Model Versus Data
Figure 3 compares the prediction of the model on insider ownership (reported in Table 1 earlier)
to the data. The horizontal axes in the first and second panels are the LaPorta et al. (1998)
index of investor protection, and “outsider value”, defined as 1 − block premiumfirm value , respectively. The
transformation of the block premium to the quantity labeled outsider value is made only for ease
of exposition so that the results can be easily compared to those using the LaPorta et al. (1998)
index. So transformed both relate positively to institutional quality, whereas the block premium
goes down with better institutional quality. The outsider value can be thought of as the fraction
of the firm’s market value that is paid out as dividends to outside shareholders instead of accruing
to insiders as private benefits of control. The block premium is from Dyck and Zingales (2004).
Insider ownership, measured by the value-weighted mean insider ownership from Kho et al. (2009),
is on the vertical axes of both panels. The dots in both panels show actual data points while the
triangles in the second panel show the model’s predictions. As a reminder, the procedure used
to generate data from the model is as follows. Two model parameters — the volatility of the
technology shock and institutional quality in the South — are first calibrated to target the median
block premium and insider ownership jointly. I then vary η∗ to target the 10th, 25th, 75th and
90th deciles of the block premium data from Dyck and Zingales (2004). Solving the model, I can
then calculate the optimal insider ownership for each of these deciles. The solid and dashed lines
represent OLS regressions estimated with the actual data as opposed to these model-generated
predictions, respectively.
The first panel simply establishes the significant negative correlation between insider ownership
and institutional quality in the data, the latter measured by the LaPorta et al. (1998) index.
The relationship is statistically significant with p << 0.01. As explained before, the mapping
between the model and the data is achieved via the block premium, for which there is a clear model
counterpart as well as an empirical estimate from Dyck and Zingales (2004). The empirical negative
relationship between insider ownership and institutional quality remains robust when using outsider
value as a proxy, statistically significant with p = 0.006. The second panel shows that the model
does a good job of replicating the pattern seen in the data. The correlation between the actual
and simulated data is 0.87, while the R-squared from a regression of actual on simulated insider
ownership is 75%. The OLS regression lines through the actual and the simulated data show that
the model does better at higher values of institutional quality, while at lower values of institutions
that capture the general quality of institutions. Only the regression for foreign equity assets shares are reported for
brevity. The results also hold for foreign equity liability shares, which is in line with the findings Faria et al. (2007)
and Faria and Mauro (2009).
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Figure 3: Insider Ownership: Model Versus Data.
Notes: Institutional quality (on the horizontal axes, higher numbers correspond to better in-
stitutions) is measured by the LaPorta et al. (1998) index in the first panel and by outsider
value (≡ 1− block premiumfirm value ) in the second panel. The block premium is from Dyck and Zingales
(2004). Insider ownership measured by the value-weighted mean insider ownership from Kho
et al. (2009) on the vertical axes. Dots show data points while triangles show model prediction.
Solid line (DATA) and dashed line (MODEL) represent OLS regression estimated with actual
data (dots) and model-generated predictions (triangles) respectively.
it overstates the amount of insider ownership. As noted earlier in the paper, the intuition behind
this discrepancy lies in the relative gains from diversification versus the losses from lowering insider
ownership. At the calibrated level of volatility, the gains are outweighed by the losses for even small
reductions in the stake away from the endowment when institutional quality is in the lower quartile.
Thus the model overstates the amount of insider ownership at the lower end of the distribution of
institutional quality.
3.4 Outsider Foreign Asset Wealth Share: Model Versus Data
Proposition 2 lets us express the share of foreign assets in the wealth of the outsider as an analytical
function of institutional quality. Of particular interest in Proposition 2 is the outsider hedging
component of the portfolio. Ideally, Proposition 2 should be taken to the data by comparing the
model’s predictions on outsider diversification to data on the fraction of wealth held by outsiders
in foreign assets. Unfortunately, there does not appear to be data on aggregate country portfolio
holdings of the type in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) that distinguishes between holdings by
outsiders and corporate insiders. Thus I do not have precise empirical counterparts for the fractions
of country (or their own) wealth held in foreign assets by insiders and outsiders separately. To
remedy this, I construct two alternative proxies for the cross section of outsider portfolios.
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The first proxy is meant to test whether the hedging component of the outsider’s portfolio
behaves in the way suggested by the theory. The empirical counterpart of this component is
calculated as follows. Recall that the expression for outsider portfolios from Proposition 2 is
λ = (1 − α)
[
1
2 +
1
2{ ψ0(2ω−1)1−(1−ψ0)(2ω−1)}
]
, and note that outsiders can only hold foreign assets that
belong to the world float portfolio, (1 − α).39 From this expression it is clear that cross-sectional
variation in outsider holdings in a particular country will either come from variations in the rest-of-
the-world float (the insider ownership channel), or from variations in the hedging component. Since
we are interested here in the latter channel, I compute the component of a country’s foreign asset
wealth share that is orthogonal to the insider ownership channel by regressing foreign assets as a
fraction of wealth on GDP-weighted insider ownership in the rest of the world, and then taking the
residuals from that regression.40 The underlying assumption is that variations in the float portfolio
in the rest of the world approximately capture the component of overall country portfolios that
is due to the lack of opportunities for outsiders to invest in foreign assets (which is, of course, a
consequence of the insider ownership channel), and the remainder is due to the hedging channel.
This proxy for outsider portfolios summarizes the latter component.
The second proxy constructs an upper bound on the extent of foreign asset holding by outsiders
and is constructed as follows. I use the notation introduced earlier, which is that K is the value of
the domestic capital stock, FA is foreign equity assets, and FL foreign equity liabilities. Assume
that insiders in a country are entirely home biased in their asset holdings, so that their wealth
consists only of a fraction α of the value of the domestic capital stock, i.e., αK. The value of
foreigners’ holdings of capital stock in the country is FL. If outsiders hold all the foreign assets
FA, then the value of outsider wealth is (1 − α)K − FL + FA.41 Thus the fraction of outsider
wealth held in foreign assets is FA(1−α)K−FL+FA , which can be calculated from the data on α, K, FL,
and FA described earlier. Note that this fraction is an upper bound on the foreign asset holding
of outsiders since it assumes that all foreign assets are held by outsiders, and insiders potentially
have some foreign assets. Herein lies the motivation for using this measure as a cross-check: if in
the case of this measure, countries with weaker domestic investor protection still exhibit a lower
degree of international diversification for outsiders, it is quite convincing that this is indeed the
case in the data.42
I compare the model-generated portfolio diversification for outsiders in a particular country to
39Since the countries in the analytical derivation are symmetric, (1− α) also happens to be float portfolio domes-
tically.
40Using a country’s own insider ownership or a simple average of insider ownership in the rest of the world yields
similar results.
41To be precise about the mapping from the model to the data, consider the case of the North outsider.
In terms of the model’s stock prices and equity shares, define the financial wealth of the Northern outsider,
Λ(st), as the value of total asset holdings in terms of the North consumption good after history st. Then,
Λ(st) ≡ P (st)λNN (st) + e(st)P ∗(st)λNS(st) = P (st)(1 − α − λSN (st)) + e(st)P ∗(st)λNS(st) = P (st)(1 − α) −
P (st)λSN (s
t) + e(st)P ∗(st)λNS(st) = (1− α)K − FL+ FA.
42I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this measure.
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Figure 4: Proposition 2: Model Versus Data Using OFA1.
Notes: Institutional quality (on the horizontal axes, higher numbers correspond to better in-
stitutions) is measured by the LaPorta et al. (1998) index in the first panel and by outsider
value (≡ 1 − block premiumfirm value ) in the second panel. Outsider diversification (measured by OFA1)
on the vertical axes. Dots show data points while triangles show model prediction. Solid line
(DATA) and dashed line (MODEL) represent OLS regression estimated with actual data (dots)
and model-generated predictions (triangles) respectively. See text for details.
the two estimated series, which correspond to the outsider hedging channel. I distinguish between
these two estimated series by labelling them OFA1 and OFA2 (Outsider Foreign Assets) respec-
tively. Since both OFA1 and OFA2 are constructed measures of outsider foreign asset holdings, I
focus on exploring how well the model does in explaining the cross-sectional variation in these two
proxies for the foreign asset positions of outsiders, rather than their levels.43 The results of this
exercise are shown in Figure 4. The first panel documents the relationship between outsider diversi-
fication measured by OFA1, and institutions in the data, the latter measured by the LaPorta et al.
(1998) index. The positive relationship is significant with p = 0.001, which remains significant with
p = 0.012 in the second panel when using the outsider value as a proxy for institutions. The model
43Comparisons of the level of model-generated diversification to the levels of the two proxy measures are not very
informative for the following reasons. The values of OFA1, being residuals from an OLS regression, have a mean of
zero by construction. The mean of OFA1 is also very close to zero (0.0003554) when the regression used to construct
it does not include a constant term, and thus the zero mean is not simply an artifact of its construction. OFA1 thus
implies that the mean country has no foreign assets in its portfolio, while a number of countries hold short positions.
However, such short positions are unlikely to be present in actual data for outsider foreign portfolios, if these were to
be available. Thus OFA1 appears to be a downward-biased proxy for true outsider diversification. At the same time,
though OFA2 is positive for all countries, it is potentially biased upwards for the reasons explained earlier. Though
the model does predict small short positions for a number of countries, comparing the levels of these positions to two
proxy measures that are likely to be biased in terms of their levels – downwards in the case of OFA1 and upwards
in the case of OFA2 – is not very useful. Thus I limit myself to comparing the cross-sectional variation in these
constructed measures to the model’s predictions.
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captures the cross-sectional variation in portfolios quite well. The correlation between the actual
and model-generated data is 0.67, while a regression of actual on simulated outsider diversification
yields an R-squared of 45%. It is important to note here that this analysis yields similar results
when using overall diversification rather than the residuals, because part of the results are then
driven by the strong correlation between insider ownership and institutions documented in Figure
3.
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Figure 5: Labor-Dividend Ratio and Covariance Ratio versus Institutions.
Notes: Institutional quality (on the horizontal axes, higher numbers correspond to better insti-
tutions) is measured by the LaPorta et al. (1998) index in both panels. The labor-dividend ratio
and the covariance ratio on the vertical axes of the left and right panels. See text for details.
Following Proposition 3, I next explore the two channels that drive outsider hedging. I first
establish that these two channels vary in the predicted direction with institutional quality in the
data. To this end Figure 5 first shows the empirical correlation between institutions, measured
by the LaPorta et al. (1998) index, and the empirical labor-dividend and covariance ratios whose
construction was detailed before. The slope coefficients for the regression lines shown are statis-
tically significant with p = 0.006 and p = 0.136 for the labor-dividend ratio and covariance ratio
respectively.44
In order to compare the model to the data, I proceed in two steps as in Heathcote and Perri
(2013). I first show the model-data comparison for the mapping between institutions and the
underlying macroeconomic channel, and then from the channel to outsider diversification. Accord-
ingly Figure 6 shows the model-data comparison of the mapping between institutions (proxied by
44The analytical solution in Proposition 3 suggests that the product of these two ratios determine diversification.
However it is not clear that once we move away from the case of perfect symmetry of the countries under which
Proposition 3 is derived, such a clear relationship would exist. I thus explore the effect of each of the ratios as
independent determinants of the hedge portfolio. There is also a statistically significant (p = 0.106) relationship of
the correct (positive) sign between the product of the ratios and the LaPorta et al. (1998) index.
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Figure 6: Hedging Channel: Labor-Dividend Ratio Using OFA1.
Notes: Institutional quality (on the horizontal axis of the left panel, higher numbers correspond
to better institutions) measured by outsider value (≡ 1− block premiumfirm value ). Labor-dividend ratio on
the vertical and horizontal axes of left and right panels respectively. Outsider foreign asset hold-
ings (measured by OFA1) on vertical axis on right panel. Dots show data points while triangles
show model prediction. Solid line (DATA) and dashed line (MODEL) represent OLS regression
estimated with actual data (dots) and model-generated predictions (triangles) respectively. See
text for details.
outsider value as described earlier) and the labor-dividend ratio in the first panel, and then between
outsider diversification (measured by OFA1) and the ratio in the second panel. The fitted OLS
lines through the actual data (solid line) and the generated data (dashed line) in the left panel
suggest that the labor-dividend ratio is more responsive to institutions in the model than in the
data. This is likely due to the indirect mapping between institutions and the ratio via the block
premium. However, the correlation between the model-generated and actual labor-dividend ratios
is still high, at 0.96. The right panel shows that, overall, the labor-dividend ratio channel goes in
the direction predicted by the model: higher ratios are associated with lower diversification due to
labor income risk comprising a higher proportion of the risk to be hedged.
Figure 7 shows the same type of model-data comparison for the covariance ratio: the covariance
ratio versus institutions (proxied by outsider value as described earlier) in the first panel, and
outsider diversification (measured by OFA1) versus the ratio in the second panel. As in the case of
the labor-dividend ratio, the first panel suggests a stronger association between the covariance ratio
and institutions in the model than in the data. As noted before, this is likely due to the two-stage
mapping between institutions and the covariance ratio via the block premium. This introduces
some noise into the covariance-institutions correlation in the case of the data. The correlation
between the model-generated and actual covariance ratios is 0.49. The right panel shows that
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Figure 7: Hedging Channel: Covariance Ratio Using OFA1.
Notes: Institutional quality (on the horizontal axis of the left panel, higher numbers correspond
to better institutions) measured by outsider value (≡ 1− block premiumfirm value ). Covariance ratio on the
vertical and horizontal axes of left and right panels respectively. Outsider foreign asset holdings
(measured by OFA1) on vertical axis on right panel. Dots show data points while triangles
show model prediction. Solid line (DATA) and dashed line (MODEL) represent OLS regression
estimated with actual data (dots) and model-generated predictions (triangles) respectively. See
text for details.
the covariance ratio channel goes in the direction predicted by the model: more negative ratios
are associated with lower diversification, explained by the hedging intuition behind Proposition
3. Diversification is sharply responsive to the covariance ratio in the model, since the larger labor
share that is associated with weaker institutions directly amplifies the effect of a negative covariance
ratio. This relationship is less pronounced in the data but still goes in the correct direction.
Note that I do not report the correlation between model-generated and actual diversifications
while discussing the second panels of Figures 6 and 7 because these would be the same as when
the second panel of Figure 4 is discussed, which is 0.67. It is not possible to isolate the effect on
diversification of each of the two constituents of the hedging channel separately since we cannot
hold one constant while varying the other. This is because both the labor-dividend ratio and
the covariance ratio are endogenously determined by the quality of institutions. Thus I attempt to
provide an empirical estimate of the relative importance of the two channels using a simple variance
decomposition exercise in the next section.
Figure 8 reports the results of the same analysis conducted with the second measure of outsider
foreign assets OFA2, which, as noted before, is the upper bound on the degree of outsider diver-
sification. The upper left panel of Figure 8 shows that the empirical correlation between outsider
diversification measured by OFA2, and institutions measured by the LaPorta et al. (1998) index.
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Figure 8: Model Data Comparisons Using Alternative Measure of Outsider Foreign Assets (OFA2).
Notes: See notes for Figures 4, 6, and 7, and text for explanations of the axes and other details.
The positive relationship is significant with p = 0.001, which remains significant with p = 0.012 in
the upper right panel when using outsider value as a proxy for institutions. The model does well
in terms of capturing the cross-sectional variation in outsider portfolios measured by OFA2. The
correlation between the actual and model-generated data is 0.57 (0.67 in the case of OFA1), while
a regression of actual on simulated outsider diversification yields an R-squared of 45% (also 45%
in the case of OFA1). Thus, the results are very similar to those using OFA1.
45
The bottom left panel of Figure 8 shows the relationship between OFA2 and the labor-dividend
45I drop New Zealand in the diagrams involving OFA2 because it is an outlier, being 3.91 standard deviations
above the mean. This is because it has both very high foreign liabilities and insider ownership, which leads to the
denominator in OFA2 =
FA
(1−α)K−FL+FA being exceptionally low. The p-values for the positive relationships reported
above are 0.037 and 0.101 when New Zealand is included.
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ratio, and corresponds to the right panel of Figure 6 which uses OFA1.
46 The fitted OLS lines
through the actual data (solid line) and the generated data (dashed line) in the bottom left panel
show that the match between the model and the data remains intact when using OFA2. The
bottom right panel shows the relationship between OFA2 and the covariance ratio in the model
versus the data, and corresponds to the right panel of Figure 7. In contrast to the comparison using
OFA1, where outsider diversification responded more sharply to the covariance ratio in the model
than in the data, the model matches the data better in terms of cross-sectional variation when the
basis of comparison is OFA2. In conclusion, both measures of outsider diversification correlate in
the predicted way to the mechanisms outlined by the theory.
3.5 Percentage of Empirical Variation Explained
A simple way to judge the empirical importance of the three channels identified by the model –
insider ownership, the relative share of labor in income, and the covariance ratio (the last two being
jointly the hedging channel) – is to ask what percentage of the variation of foreign asset holdings
in the data can be explained by the empirical counterparts of these three variables. To do this,
foreign equity assets (portfolio equity and FDI) as a fraction of wealth is regressed on the three
variables that were used in the preceding analysis – insider ownership, and the estimated values
of the labor-dividend and covariance ratios. Table 2 reports the results from these regressions.
The table reports the estimated standardized coefficients to make their magnitudes comparable.47
For the univariate regressions (1)-(3), I interpret the R-squared of the regression as the maximum
percentage of the variance in diversification explained by each independent variable. I do the same
for regression (4) when commenting on the overall importance of the hedging channel. For the
multivariate regression in column (5), I provide an interpretation of the square of the standardized
coefficient of a particular variable that takes into account the empirical covariances between the
three explanatory variables.
I interpret the R-squared for regressions (1)-(4) as an upper bound on the percentage of variation
in foreign assets explained by the corresponding set of variables. By this interpretation, insider
ownership, the labor-dividend ratio, and the covariance ratio can individually explain up to 51%,
46%, and 15% of the cross-sectional variation in diversification, respectively. The hedging channel,
which is a combination of the labor-dividend ratio and the covariance ratio channels, can explain
up to 52% — the R-squared in column (4) — of the variation in foreign diversification. The insider
ownership and hedging channels together explain up to 60% — the R-squared in column (5) — of
46I exclude from Figure 8 the relationships between institutions and the labor-dividend and covariance ratios in
the model versus the data since these are the same as the ones depicted on the left panels of Figures 6 and 7.
47Standardized coefficients refer to the coefficients in a regression with all variables demeaned and divided by
their standard deviation. In a linear model of the form y = c + βx + , let βˆ and βˆstd refer to the estimated
unstandardized and standardized coefficients respectively. The fraction of variance explained by a variable x is
defined as Var(βˆx)
Var(y)
= βˆ2 Var(x)
Var(y)
= βˆ2std.
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Table 2: Variance Decomposition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Insider Ownership -0.71*** -0.54*
Labor-Dividend Ratio -0.68*** -0.63*** −0.16b
Covariance Ratio 0.38* 0.25a 0.28c
Observations 21 21 21 21 21
R-squared 0.51 0.46 0.15 0.52 0.60
Notes: Coefficients reported are standardized. Constant is 0 in each case since coefficients
are standardized. Coefficients marked ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. Other p-values are: (a) p=0.164; (b) p=0.11; (c) p=0.62. See text for details.
the variation in diversification. In the last regression, the squares of the standardized coefficients
offer an approximate idea about the minimum fraction of variation explained by each variable.48
Accordingly, the insider ownership, labor-dividend ratio, and covariance ratio channels explain at
least 29%, 3%, and 8% — which are the squares of the standardized coefficients in column (5) —
of the variation in international diversification. This information is summed up as follows: insider
ownership channel (between 29% and 51%); hedging channel (between 11% and 52%); out of which
labor-dividend channel (between 3% and 46%) and covariance channel (between 8% and 15%). I
thus draw the following qualified conclusions from this analysis: Insider ownership is very likely
the most important channel through which weak investor protection institutions affect the lack of
international diversification. One cannot rule out that the hedging channel is also quantitatively
very significant, and may in fact explain up to 52% of the variation in international portfolios.49
48The reasoning behind this assertion is as follows. We can write the estimated R-squared from the regression
as follows: R2 = Var(yˆ)
Var(y)
= Var(βˆ1x1)
Var(y)
+ Var(βˆ2x2)
Var(y)
+ Var(βˆ3x3)
Var(y)
+ 2βˆ1βˆ2Cov(x1,x2)
Var(y)
+ 2βˆ1βˆ3Cov(x1,x3)
Var(y)
+ 2βˆ2βˆ3Cov(x2,x3)
Var(y)
=
βˆ21,std + βˆ
2
2,std + βˆ
2
3,std + 2βˆ1,stdβˆ2,stdr1,2 + 2βˆ1,stdβˆ3,stdr1,3 + 2βˆ2,stdβˆ3,stdr2,3. Here y, x1, x2, and x3 are foreign assets,
insider ownership, the labor-dividend ratio, and the covariance ratio, respectively, and ri,j is the correlation coefficient
between variables i and j. Two caveats: (i) we treated the estimated βˆs as known constants in this derivation; (ii)
the formula only holds approximately in the data because it has not been adjusted for the different degrees of freedom
used by the software (Stata) to estimate each individual term. In our data, the values of the individual terms are as
follows: R2︸︷︷︸
(0.597)
≈ βˆ21,std︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.293)
+ βˆ22,std︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.025)
+ βˆ23,std︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.076)
+ 2βˆ1,stdβˆ2,stdr1,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.138)
+ 2βˆ1,stdβˆ3,stdr1,3︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.041)
+ 2βˆ2,stdβˆ3,stdr2,3︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.017)
= 0.589. Since all the
covariance-based terms are positive, the squares of the standardized coefficients are approximate lower bounds for
the percentage of variation explained.
49The reader may wonder why the minimum importance attributable to the labor-dividend ratio channel is so
small, while in Figure 5 and in the univariate regression it appeared to be strongly correlated with diversification.
The reason is that the labor-dividend ratio as it appears in Proposition 3 is L¯
D¯(1−α) , which has insider ownership in
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However, it appears from Table 2 and Figure 7 that, quantitatively, the covariance ratio channel is
the least important and robust among the three channels identified by the theory.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper analyzes the international portfolio diversification problem of corporate insiders and
small, security-only investors in the presence of corporate governance frictions and weak investor
protection. It has three main contributions. First, it presents a framework in which the analysis of
the portfolio allocation of outsiders and insiders can be combined, yielding analytical solutions to
the former and numerical solutions to the latter. Second, it identifies two possible channels through
which institutions affect international diversification, which are labeled the “insider ownership” and
“outsider hedging” channels. Third, the paper provides cross-sectional evidence that the macroeco-
nomic mechanism behind the hedging channel holds in the data, and quantifies the contribution of
the insider ownership and hedging channels. I find that these two channels account for at least 29%
and 11% of the cross-country variation in international diversification, respectively, and potentially
even more. In fact, together they can explain up to 60% of the variation in diversification. Among
the two separate channels that drive outsider hedging, the labor-dividend ratio channel appears
to be more robust and quantitatively significant than the covariance ratio channel. Thus I con-
clude, conservatively, that weak institutions lower international diversification primarily through
concentrated ownership of firms, with outsider hedging also playing a quantitatively significant
role. The implications of the model are also consistent with a wide range of empirical phenomena
documented elsewhere in the literature, such as the higher equity market volatility (Albuquerque
and Wang, 2008) and lower stock prices Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) in countries with weaker
investor protection.
There could be a number of alternative explanations for the stylized pattern that motivates the
paper, that countries with weaker institutions hold fewer foreign assets and issue fewer foreign lia-
bilities.50 One could simply be lower financial literacy, or higher transaction costs and legal barriers
to foreign investment inflows and outflows in the South. First, note that the paper concludes that
institutions affect international diversification primarily through concentrated ownership, which is
unlikely to be caused primarily by these factors. Also, since the stylized fact persists (see Table
3) while controlling for the general level of development and capital account openness, as well as
insider ownership, these cannot be the sole explanation even for the home-bias in outsider portfolios.
It could also be that in countries with weaker institutions domestic investors have an advantage
either in the form of a superior endowment of information or lower costs of acquisition of new
the denominator. This is the correct metric for Proposition 3 since what should matter for outsider diversification
for a country is the labor income ratio to the share of claims to dividends actually owned by outsiders. In the
regression, however, controlling for insider ownership absorbs part of the effect that should be properly attributed to
the labor-dividend ratio channel.
50See Coeurdacier and Rey (2013) for an extensive survey of potential alternatives.
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information about local assets over foreign investors, like in the models of Brennan and Cao (1997),
Hatchondo (2008), or Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009). This would lead to the South holding
most of its domestic assets or alternately being able to issue fewer foreign liabilities. This domestic
advantage could apply to portfolio equity, and also to direct equity investments as in the models
of Razin et al. (1999) or Goldstein and Razin (2006). In a related vein, agents in the South could
be more prone to behaviorial biases such as a greater belief in the accuracy of their information
on local assets, as in Dumas et al. (2011). While these channels are undoubtedly important, the
evidence I present about the macroeconomic mechanism underlying the story in the paper suggests
that optimal portfolios in the South could be biased towards home assets even in the absence
of information asymmetries or behaviorial biases. In addition, it is not clear how these theories
of transaction costs, information asymmetries, or behaviorial biases could generate the first and
second moments found in the data that are consistent with the hedging channel.
Recent work, exemplified by Caballero et al. (2008) and Mendoza et al. (2009) among others,
has highlighted the role of the relative scarcity of high quality assets in the South in determining
international capital flows. Furthermore, common sense tells us that capital should flee from
countries that have weaker institutions and hence a lower supply of safe assets. However, how
much wealth is allocated to an asset depends on how well it hedges other sources of risk (the
hedging channel), and whether it is endogenously costly for the holder to transact in it (the insider
ownership channel). The key insight of this is paper is that for the case of equity assets, both
of these are intimately linked to domestic institutions and corporate governance. Contrary to
intuition, I find that domestic investors in countries with weaker institutions will hold more of
their own country’s portfolio precisely because these have weaker institutions. I thus argue in this
paper that a number of features of the data, such as the cross section of insider ownership and
diversification, are driven by a plausible agency friction within firms.
Though most of the stock of international assets is held by a handful of countries with similar,
well-developed capital markets, nations where investor rights are relatively weak are playing an in-
creasingly important role in international capital movements. Understanding how agency problems
affect macroeconomic aggregates and portfolio allocation thus constitutes an important set of open
questions that this paper tries to address. An extension of the work in this paper would seek to
provide a fully dynamic framework for insider ownership that is better able to address questions
about the time-path of country portfolios after financial liberalization and institutional reforms.
Other promising avenues of research are to introduce bond financing for the firm to analyze the
role of corporate debt, or to explore endogenous investor protection reforms in this framework.
These investigations, as well as a more comprehensive test of the theory using data on foreign asset
holdings of corporate insiders and outsiders, are left for future work.
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A Appendices
A.1 Proofs
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof below follows Heathcote and Perri (2013) closely. The analytical solutions in this part
of the appendix assume that: (a) the outsiders’ utilities are separable between consumption and
leisure and logarithmic in consumption; (b) the technology for combining intermediate goods to
form the final consumption-investment good in each country is Cobb-Douglas and displays symmet-
ric home bias; and (c) the two countries are ex-ante symmetric in that they have the same initial
values of capital stock and technology, and the same stochastic driving shocks, and also symmetric
in the sense that α = α∗ and η = η∗.
Planner’s Problem
The social planner faces a static maximization problem at time t after the realization of uncertainty.
The Lagrangian at time t maximized with respect to {Ct, C∗t, Lt, L∗t, at, a∗t, bt, b∗t} for each {t}∞0
is as follows:
Lt =
[
U(Ct, Lt) + U(C
∗
t, L
∗
t) + λat(AtKt
αLt
1−α − at − a∗t) + λbt(A∗tK∗tαL∗t1−α − bt − b∗t)
+λHt(G(at, bt)− Ct − It −Mt − Φt) + λFt(G∗(a∗t, b∗t)− C∗t − I∗t −M∗t − Φ∗t)
]
(A.1)
Since the first order conditions of the planner’s problem are all static, the time subscripts are
dropped for notational simplicity.
UC = λH (A.2)
UC∗ = λF (A.3)
UL + λa(1− α)AKαL−α = 0 (A.4)
UL∗ + λb(1− α)A∗K∗αL∗−α = 0 (A.5)
λa = λHGa (A.6)
λb = λHGb (A.7)
λa = λFG
∗
a∗ (A.8)
λb = λFG
∗
b∗ (A.9)
The planner takes the optimality conditions arising out of the insiders’ problems (listed in the
paper) as given each time t. To prove that the equilibrium described in Proposition 2 exists, we
show that the planner’s allocation can be decentralized under certain prices using just the two
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equity shares under the assumptions on functional forms noted above, and that these prices are
also consistent with the optimality conditions for the insiders’ behavior. Let goods prices be given
by:
qa =
ωG
a
(A.10)
qb =
(1− ω)G
b
(A.11)
qa∗ =
(1− ω)G∗
a∗
(A.12)
qb∗ =
ωG∗
b∗
(A.13)
e =
qa
qa∗
=
qb
qb∗
(A.14)
The prices {qa, qb, qa∗ , qb∗} ensure that intermediate goods are used optimally in the stock trade
economy.
W = (1− θ)
(
1 +
(1− α)2
2αη
)Ya
Lt
(A.15)
W ∗ = (1− θ)
(
1 +
(1− α)2
2αη
) Yb
L∗
(A.16)
These wages ensure that the labor demand optimality conditions from insiders are satisfied. Also
substituting the above prices into the planner’s optimality conditions for labor usage gives us back
the optimal labor supply conditions of the outsiders. Note that the resource constraints for the
planner’s problem and the stock market equilibrium posited are identical. Also, stock market clear-
ing is trivial by the symmetry of the portfolio shares.
Construction of the Portfolio Share λ
In the following part I deliberately keep the state notation to emphasize that the portfolio shares
constructed ensure risk sharing for each state of nature under the functional form assumptions.
Consider the budget constraints of the outsiders in the two countries. With time invariant optimal
portfolio shares the budget constraints reduce to
C(st) = qa(s
t)W (st)L(st) + λNND(s
t) + λNSe(s
t)D∗(st)
C∗(st) = qb(st)W ∗(st)L∗(st) +
λSND(s
t)
e(st)
+ λSSD
∗(st).
Note that these are free of the stock prices P (st) and P ∗(st). Using the candidate expression for
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wages, and the optimal fraction of private benefits from the insiders’ problem,
W (st)L(st) =
1− θ
α
(
α+
(1− α)2
2η
)
Ya(s
t)
W ∗(st)L∗(st) =
1− θ
α
(
α+
(1− α)2
2η
)
Yb(s
t)
f(st) =
1− α
η
f∗(st) =
1− α
η
dividends can be written as
D(st) = qa(s
t)Ya(s
t)[ψ1 − ψ0]− I(st)
D∗(st) = qb(st)Yb(st)[[ψ1 − ψ0]]− I∗(st),
where ψ0 = (1− θ){1 + (1−α)
2
2αη } and ψ1 = η+α−1η .
Thus the budget constraints reduce to
C(st) = ψ0y(s
t) + λNN [(ψ1 − ψ0)y(st)− I(st)] + λNSe(st)[(ψ1 − ψ0)y∗(st)− I∗(st)]
C∗(st) = ψ0y∗(st) +
λSN
e(st)
[(ψ1 − ψ0)y(st)− I(st)] + λSS [(ψ1 − ψ0)y∗(st)− I∗(st)].
With logarithmic utility, the planner’s constrained (by the insiders’ socially sub-optimal decisions)
Pareto-efficient consumption allocations follow
C(st) = e(st)C∗(st).
This can be seen from combining the first order conditions of the planner’s problem and using the
expressions for goods prices posited before. Therefore we need to construct portfolio shares such
that the above condition holds, while being consistent with the insiders’ optimality conditions and
the posited prices. If there exists a portfolio share λ such that this condition holds for all states,
then λ must satisfy
C(st)−e(st)C∗(st) = [ψ0+(ψ1−ψ0)(2λ+α−1)]{y(st)−e(st)y∗(st)}−(2λ+α−1){I(st)−e(st)I∗(st)} = 0,
where I have expressed all portfolio shares in terms of λ by using symmetry and market clearing
in asset markets, which imply that λNN = λSS = λ and λSN = λNS = 1− α− λ.
Now, y(st) = qa(s
t)Ya(s
t) = qa(s
t){a(st) + a∗(st)} = ωY (st) + (1 − ω)e(st)Y ∗(st) and y∗(st) =
qb(s
t)Yb(s
t) = qb(s
t){b(st)+ b∗(st)} = (1−ω)Y (st)e(st) +ωY ∗(st). Henceforth for all variables x, ∆x(st)
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denotes the value of x(st)− e(st)x∗(st). Therefore,
∆y(st) = y(st)− e(st)y∗(st)
= (2ω − 1){Y (st)− e(st)Y ∗(st)}
= (2ω − 1)∆Y (st).
Using the final-goods market-clearing conditions and the expression for the insiders’ consumption
demand,
Y (st) = C(st) +K(st)− (1− δ)K(st−1) +M(st) + Φ(st)
Y ∗(st) = Cm∗(st) +K∗(st)− (1− δ)K∗(st−1) +M∗(st) + Φ∗(st)
M(st) = αD(st) + qa(s
t)f(st)Ya(s
t)− Φ(st)
M∗(st) = αD∗(st) + qb(st)f∗(st)Yb(st)− Φ∗(st),
together with the expressions for the optimal stealing fraction and dividends, we have
∆y(st) = (2ω − 1)∆Y (st)
= (2ω − 1)[∆C(st) + ∆I(st) + {αθ + (1 + θ)(1− α)
2
2η
}∆y(st)− α∆I(st)].
This gives after some algebra
∆y(st) =
(2ω − 1)
ψ2
{∆C(st) + (1− α)∆I(st)},
where
ψ2 = 1− (2ω − 1){αθ + (1 + θ)(1− α)
2
2η
}.
Now, plugging in the value of ∆y(st) in the expression for ∆C(st), we get, for some constant µ
µ∆C(st) = [ψ2
−1(1− α)(2ω − 1){ψ0 + (ψ1 − ψ0)(2λ+ α− 1)} − (2λ+ α− 1)]∆I(st).
This expression gives us the value of the portfolio share, λ, that will ensure that the complete
markets condition, ∆C(st) = 0, holds for all states. The value of λ is calculated by simply as-
suming this the condition holds, and then solving for λ and this is the λ stated in Proposition 2.
Thus by construction λ satisfies the optimal consumption allocations of the planner’s problem and
satisfies the outsiders’ optimality conditions and the budget constraints of the outsider of the stock
trade economy. Now note that by construction, the stock prices below satisfy the four first order
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conditions of the outsiders’ stock purchases.
Pt = Et
∞∑
s=0
βt
UC(Cs+t+1)
UC(Ct)
Ds+t+1 (A.17)
P ∗t = Et
∞∑
s=0
βt
UC∗(C
∗
s+t+1)
UC∗(C∗t)
et+1
et
D∗s+t+1 (A.18)
This completes the proof of Proposition 2 in Section 2.5. 
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Plugging in C(st) = qa(s
t)W (st)L(st)+λNND(s
t)+λNSe(s
t)D∗(st) and C∗(st) = qb(st)W ∗(st)L∗(st)
+λSND(s
t)
e(st) +λSSD
∗(st) into C(st) = e(st)C∗(st) and denoting qa(st)W (st)L(st) by L and qb(st)W ∗(st)L∗(st)
by L∗, we get upon log-linearizing around the symmetric steady-state,
L¯Lˆ+D¯Dˆλ+ e¯D¯∗Dˆ∗(1−α−λ)+ e¯D¯∗eˆ(1−α−λ) ≈ e¯L¯∗Lˆ∗+ e¯L¯∗eˆ+D¯Dˆ(1−α−λ)+ e¯D¯∗Dˆ∗λ+ e¯D¯∗eˆλ
Gathering terms and noting that D¯∗ = D¯, L¯∗ = L¯, e¯ = 1 in a symmetric equilibrium we get
(1− α− 2λ)D¯(Dˆ − eˆ− Dˆ∗) ≈ L¯(Lˆ− eˆ− Lˆ∗).
Denoting (Dˆ − eˆ− Dˆ∗) as ∆Dˆ and (Lˆ− eˆ− Lˆ∗) as ∆Lˆ we get
(1− α− 2λ)D¯∆Dˆ ≈ L¯∆Lˆ
which gives
(2λ+ α− 1) ≈ − L¯
D¯
Cov(∆Lˆ,∆Dˆ)
Var(∆Dˆ)
.
Solving for λ and comparing to the expression in Proposition 2 gives the result. 
A.1.3 Permitting Outsiders to Trade Bonds
Assume that outsiders can trade in two bonds that pay one unit of the final good of each country,
in addition to equity. The North outsider’s budget constraint (2.6) then is
C(st) + P (st)(λNN (s
t)− λNN (st−1)) + e(st)P ∗(st)(λNS(st)− λNS(st−1))
+p(st)(BNN (s
t)−BNN (st−1)) + e(st)p∗(st)(BNS(st)−BNS(st−1) = qa(st)W (st)L(st)
+λNN (s
t−1)D(st) + λNS(st−1)e(st)D∗(st) +BNN (st−1) + e(st)BNS(st−1),
(A.19)
where BNN and BNS are the North outsider’s holdings of non-contingent bonds which pay one unit
of North and South final good respectively, while p and p∗ are their prices.
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As discussed in Coeurdacier et al. (2010), with two additional assets, we need two additional
shocks for markets to be locally complete and there to be well defined positions on these additional
assets. Examples include shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment, to tastes, news about
future productivity, and so on. Since the precise form of the shock is not essential for the derivation
of the steady state portfolios we are interested in, I leave them unspecified. As in Coeurdacier et al.
(2010), the Backus-Smith-Kollmann condition (see Backus and Smith, 1993; Kollmann, 1995) holds
up to a first order approximation in this setup. I thus find portfolios such that the ratio of home to
foreign marginal utilities for outsiders are equated to the real exchange rate, so that Cˆt− Cˆ∗t = −eˆt,
where these variables are expressed in percentage deviations from steady state values. With country
symmetry, so that BNN = −BSN = BSS = −BNS ≡ B, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4 When the set of available assets are equity and real bonds, the portfolios are re-
spectively
λ = (1− α)
[1
2
+
1
2
{ ψ0(2ω − 1)
1− (1− ψ0)(2ω − 1)}
]
(A.20)
and
B =
1
2
+
1
2
2(1− ω) + ψ0(2ω − 1)(2− α)
1− (1− ψ0)(2ω − 1)
+
1
2
( ψ0(2ω − 1)(α− 3)
1− (2ω − 1)(αθ + (1+θ)(1−α)22η )
)(
1 +
(ψ1 − ψ0)(2ω − 1)(1− α)
1− (1− ψ0)(2ω − 1)
)
. (A.21)
Proof: Follows from using the budget constraint (A.19) and its foreign counterpart. The steps
are the same as for Proposition 2, which consist of finding static portfolio positions such that the
Backus-Smith-Kollman condition holds (see Backus and Smith, 1993; Kollmann, 1995; Coeurdacier
et al., 2010). 
Comparison to the expression in Proposition 2 shows that the equity portfolio remains un-
changed by the inclusion of bonds. I also verify that this holds when σ 6= 1 and γ 6= 1 by solving
for portfolios such that Cˆt− Cˆ∗t = − eˆtγ . In this case, σ and γ appear in the bond portfolios but not
in the equity portfolio, as in Coeurdacier et al. (2010).
A.1.4 Equity Hedge Portfolio With Bonds
I show here that the appropriate covariance ratio R should be calculated using the residuals of the
projection of relative labor and dividend income on the real exchange rate. Plugging in C(st) =
qa(s
t)W (st)L(st) + λNND(s
t) + λNSe(s
t)D∗(st) + B(1 − e(st)) and C∗(st) = qb(st)W ∗(st)L∗(st)
+λSND(s
t)
e(st) + λSSD
∗(st) + B(1 − 1e(st)) into C(st) = e(st)C∗(st) and denoting qa(st)W (st)L(st) by
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L and qb(st)W ∗(st)L∗(st) by L∗, we get upon log-linearizing around the symmetric steady-state,
L¯Lˆ+D¯Dˆλ+e¯D¯∗Dˆ∗(1−α−λ)+e¯D¯∗eˆ(1−α−λ)−e¯eˆB ≈ e¯L¯∗Lˆ∗+e¯L¯∗eˆ+D¯Dˆ(1−α−λ)+e¯D¯∗Dˆ∗λ+e¯D¯∗eˆλ+e¯eˆB.
Gathering terms and noting that D¯∗ = D¯, L¯∗ = L¯, e¯ = 1 in a symmetric equilibrium we get
(1− α− 2λ)D¯(Dˆ − eˆ− Dˆ∗) + 2eˆB ≈ L¯(Lˆ− eˆ− Lˆ∗).
Denoting (Dˆ − eˆ− Dˆ∗) as ∆Dˆ and (Lˆ− eˆ− Lˆ∗) as ∆Lˆ we get
(1− α− 2λ)D¯∆Dˆ + 2eˆB ≈ L¯∆Lˆ.
Taking the projection of the above equation on eˆ, P(. | eˆ), and noting that P(eˆ | eˆ) = eˆ we get,
(1− α− 2λ)D¯P(∆Dˆ | eˆ) + 2eˆB ≈ L¯P(∆Lˆ | eˆ).
Subtracting from the original equation we have
(1− α− 2λ)D¯
[
∆Dˆ − P(∆Dˆ | eˆ)
]
≈ L¯
[
∆Lˆ− P(∆Lˆ | eˆ)
]
.
This gives
(2λ+ α− 1) ≈ − L¯
D¯
Coveˆ(∆Lˆ,∆Dˆ)
Vareˆ(∆Dˆ)
,
where
Coveˆ(∆Lˆ,∆Dˆ) = E
(
∆Dˆ − P(∆Dˆ | eˆ)
)(
∆Lˆ− P(∆Lˆ | eˆ)
)
,
Vareˆ(∆Dˆ) = E
(
∆Dˆ − P(∆Dˆ | eˆ)
)2
,
and E is the expectations operator. Solving for λ shows the hedge portfolio as a function of
conditional covariance and variances. 
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A.2 Stylized Fact Robustness
Table 3: Robustness of the Stylized Fact to Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
La Porta Index 0.054*** 0.058*** 0.059** 0.052*** 0.064*** 0.051*** 0.042*** 0.057***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
GDP -0.011
(0.01)
PC GDP -0.001
(0.00)
Trade
GDP 0.000
(0.00)
Domestic Credit
GDP -0.000
(0.00)
Capital Openness 0.005
(0.01)
Insider Ownership -0.002
(0.00)
EME Dummy 0.013
(0.04)
Constant -0.296*** -0.316*** -0.322** -0.294*** -0.329*** -0.282*** -0.090 -0.327**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.16) (0.13)
Observations 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
Adjusted R-squared 0.47 0.48 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.47 0.45
Notes: Point estimates of regression coefficients with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets. Specifications
(1)-(8) all include a constant term and add the regressors listed in the first column one by one. Coefficients marked ∗ ∗ ∗,
∗∗, and ∗ are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Dependent variable: international diversification measured
by total foreign equity (portfolio and FDI) assets as a fraction of national wealth. Independent variables: Institutional
quality index is the simple average of the indices from LaPorta et al. (1998) which measure the rule of law, risk of contract
repudiation and expropriation, accounting standards, and efficacy of the judicial system ; GDP in trillions of USD, per
capita GDP in thousands of USD, trade as percentage of GDP, domestic credit to private sector as percentage of GDP from
the WorldBank (2008); Chinn and Ito (2008) measure of capital account openness; average of ownership concentration in
1994 and 2004 from Kho et al. (2009); Emerging Market Economy dummy according to IMF classification.
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A.3 Calibration
Table 4: Benchmark Calibration
Parameter Value
Common Preferences
Discount factor β = 0.99
Coefficient of relative risk aversion γ = 1
Outsider Preferences
Frisch labor supply elasticity 1ψ = 1
Technology
Elasticity of substitution between N, S intermediates σ = 1
Import share ω = 0.15
Capital share θ = 0.34
Depreciation δ = 0.025
Institutions
N institutional quality η = 106
S institutional quality η∗ = 160
N insider ownership α = 0.1235
Uncertainty
N shocks Zt = 0.91Zt−1 + t
S shocks Z∗t = 0.91Z∗t−1 + ∗t
Variance of N shock σ2 = 0.006
2
Variance of S shock σ2∗ = 1.75
2 × 0.0062
Covariance of N and S shock Cov(, ∗) = 0
Notes: Parameter values used in the benchmark calibration of Section 2.6.
The values of η∗ and σ2∗ jointly target the median block premium and insider
ownership as explained in the text.
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A.4 Sample Definitions
Sample used for Figure 1: Intersection of set of countries used in LaPorta et al. (1998), and
covered by WorldBank (2008), excluding financial centers Ireland and Switzerland (total FA +
FL > 150% of GDP). 41 countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan,
Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey,
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Zimbabwe. See LaPorta et al. (1998) for sample
selection criteria.
Sample used for OLS regression: Intersection of the above sample with that of Kho et al.
(2009), which is used for insider ownership data. 32 countries, subset of above sample (excludes
the italicized countries).
Sample used for data-model comparisons: Intersection of above sample with sample in Dyck
and Zingales (2004) which is used for private benefits of control. Also excludes Argentina, Indonesia,
Jordan (gaps in fixed capital investment data) and Zimbabwe (hyperinflation towards the end of
the sample period), and 6 countries for which constructed dividends are negative (Egypt, Japan,
Malaysia, Norway, Singapore, Thailand). 21 countries.
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B ONLINE APPENDICES
B.1 Market Clearing Conditions and Equilibrium
Relative prices of intermediate goods, qa(s
t) and qb(s
t) adjust such that
a(st) + a∗(st) = Ya(st) (B.1)
b(st) + b∗(st) = Yb(st). (B.2)
The final consumption good market clearing requires
C(st) +K(st)− (1− δ)K(st−1) +M(st) = Y (st)− Φ(st) (B.3)
Cm∗(s
t) +K∗(st)− (1− δ)K∗(st−1) +M∗(st) = Y ∗(st)− Φ∗(st) (B.4)
so that consumption demand by the representative outsider, investment demand and the consump-
tion of the insider add up to the output of final goods, net of the deadweight loss associated with
procuring private benefits of control.
Stock market clearing requires that
λNN (s
t) + λSN (s
t) = 1− α(st) (B.5)
λNS(s
t) + λSS(s
t) = 1− α∗(st) (B.6)
so that the total shares held by outsiders in a country’s firms is constrained by the holdings of the
insider. The fractions (1 − α(st)) and (1 − α∗(st)) are the float portfolios in the North and the
South.
Definition 1 An equilibrium in this model is a set of prices P (st), P ∗(st), R(st), R∗(st), W (st),
W ∗(st), qa(st), q∗a(st), qb(st), q∗b (s
t), and e(st) for all st and t satisfying the following conditions
1 The insider’s investment, employment and private benefits optimality conditions (2.14), (2.15)
and (2.16) hold in the North. Analogous conditions hold in the South.
2 The outsider’s stock purchase and labor supply optimality conditions (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9) hold
in the North. Analogous conditions hold in the South.
3 Intermediate inputs are combined optimally according to conditions (2.3) and (2.4) in the North.
Analogous conditions hold in the South.
4 Intermediate inputs resource constraints (B.1) and (B.2) hold worldwide.
5 Final goods resource constraints (B.3) and (B.4) hold in each country.
1
6 Asset markets clear according to constraints (B.5) and (B.6).
B.2 Steady-State Values
If the countries are ex-ante symmetric, η = η∗ = η¯, α = α∗ = α¯, ψ0 = ψ∗0 = ψ¯0, and ψ1 = ψ∗1 = ψ¯1.
The non-stochastic steady-state values of capital stocks Kss and K∗ss can be expressed in terms
of Lss = L∗ss = L¯ss and qssa = q∗ssa = qssb = q
∗ss
b = q¯
ss. The actual expression for q¯ss is given later.
Kss =
[ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q
ss
a
1
β + δ − 1
] 1
1−θ
L¯ss =
[ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] 1
1−θ
L¯ss (B.7)
K∗ss =
[ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q
∗ss
b
1
β + δ − 1
] 1
1−θ
L¯ss =
[ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] 1
1−θ
L¯ss (B.8)
The other aggregate quantities, which can also be expressed in terms of Lss = L∗ss = L¯ss and q¯ss,
are as follows. Note that these depend on the institution-related parameters α¯ and η¯ only through
Kss and K∗ss.
Y ssa = K
ssθL¯ss
1−θ
=
(Kss
L¯ss
)θ
L¯ss =
[ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] θ
1−θ
L¯ss (B.9)
Y ssb = K
∗ssθL¯ss1−θ =
(K∗ss
L¯ss
)θ
L¯ss =
[ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] θ
1−θ
L¯ss (B.10)
Y ss = qssa Y
ss
a = q¯
ss
[ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] θ
1−θ
L¯ss (B.11)
Y ∗ss = q∗ssb Y
ss
b = q¯
ss
[ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] θ
1−θ
L¯ss (B.12)
qssa a
ss = ωY ss ⇒ ass = ωY ssa = ω
[ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] θ
1−θ
L¯ss (B.13)
ass + a∗ss = Y ssa ⇒ a∗ss = (1− ω)Y ssa = (1− ω)
[ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] θ
1−θ
L¯ss (B.14)
q∗ssb b
∗ss = ωY ∗ss ⇒ b∗ss = ωY ssb = ω
[ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] θ
1−θ
L¯ss (B.15)
bss + b∗ss = Y ssa ⇒ bss = (1− ω)Y ssb = (1− ω)
[ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] θ
1−θ
L¯ss (B.16)
If G(a, b) = aωb1−ω, then qssa , q∗ssa , qssb , and q
∗ss
b are given by
qssa = q
∗ss
a = q
ss
b = q
∗ss
b = ω
ω(1− ω)1−ω = q¯ss (B.17)
2
which implies
ess = 1 (B.18)
tss = 1. (B.19)
The following quantities reflect the distribution of aggregate final output among various sources
of absorbtion with the economy and are affected by the institution-related parameters α¯ and η¯
independently of Kss and K∗ss, of which they are also functions.
Dss =
[(1− θ)
θ
(ψ¯1 − ψ¯0)
ψ¯0
(
1
β
+ δ − 1)− δ
]
Kss
=
[(1− θ)
θ
(ψ¯1 − ψ¯0)
ψ¯0
(
1
β
+ δ − 1)− δ
][ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] 1
1−θ
L¯ss (B.20)
D∗ss =
[(1− θ)
θ
(ψ¯1 − ψ¯0)
ψ¯0
(
1
β
+ δ − 1)− δ
]
K∗ss
=
[(1− θ)
θ
(ψ¯1 − ψ¯0)
ψ¯0
(
1
β
+ δ − 1)− δ
][ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] 1
1−θ
L¯ss (B.21)
Iss = δKss = δ
[ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] 1
1−θ
L¯ss (B.22)
I∗ss = δK∗ss = δ
[ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] 1
1−θ
L¯ss (B.23)
M ss = α¯Dss +
1− α¯2
2η¯
Y ss (B.24)
M∗ss = α¯D∗ss +
1− α¯2
2η¯
Y ∗ss (B.25)
Css = Y ss −M ss − Iss − Φss = (1− (1− α¯)
2
2η¯
)Y ss −M ss − Iss
=
[
(1− (1− α¯)
2
2η¯
)q¯ss
[ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ssa
1
β + δ − 1
] θ
1−θ − (δ + α¯( 1
β
− 1))
[ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] 1
1−θ
]
L¯ss
(B.26)
C∗ss = Y ∗ss −M∗ss − I∗ss − Φ∗ss = (1− (1− α¯)
2
2η¯
)Y ∗ss −M∗ss − I∗ss
=
[
(1− (1− α¯)
2
2η¯
q¯ss
[ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] θ
1−θ − (δ + α¯( 1
β
− 1))
[ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] 1
1−θ
]
L¯ss
(B.27)
(B.28)
3
The parameters η and η∗ are selected such that steady-state dividends are positive. In particular
with symmetry
η = η∗ = η¯ >
(1− α¯){(1 + α¯)( 1β + δ − 1)− θ(1− α¯)( 1β − 1)}
2α¯θ( 1β − 1)
Other prices are as follows51:
W ss = ψ¯0
(Kss
L¯ss
)θ
= ψ¯0
[ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] θ
1−θ
(B.29)
W ∗ss = ψ¯0
(K∗ss
L¯ss
)θ
= ψ¯0
[ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] θ
1−θ
(B.30)
P ss =
β
1− βD
ss =
β
1− β
[(1− θ)
θ
(ψ¯1 − ψ¯0)
ψ¯0
(
1
β
+ δ − 1)− δ
]
Kss
=
β
1− β
[(1− θ)
θ
(ψ¯1 − ψ¯0)
ψ¯0
(
1
β
+ δ − 1)− δ
][ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] 1
1−θ
L¯ss (B.31)
P ∗ss =
β
1− βD
∗ss =
β
1− β
[(1− θ)
θ
(ψ¯1 − ψ¯0)
ψ¯0
(
1
β
+ δ − 1)− δ
]
K∗ss
=
β
1− β
[(1− θ)
θ
(ψ¯1 − ψ¯0)
ψ¯0
(
1
β
+ δ − 1)− δ
][ θ
1− θ
ψ¯0q¯ss
1
β + δ − 1
] 1
1−θ
L¯ss (B.32)
Rss =
1
β
− 1 (B.33)
R∗ss =
1
β
− 1 (B.34)
Of the above prices, Rss and R∗ss are independent of the institutional parameters.
B.3 Details of Numerical Methods
This section contains descriptions of the numerical algorithms used in the paper. The procedure
followed to compute the steady state portfolios follows Tille and Van Wincoop (2010) and Devereux
and Sutherland (2011) closely.
B.3.1 Algorithm for Computing a Numerical Solution for Portfolios
Following Devereux and Sutherland (2011) we can rewrite the North outsider’s budget constraint
in terms of the outsider’s total financial wealth, the amount of this wealth invested in the North
asset (both in terms of the North consumption good), and the excess returns on the North asset.
In terms of the stock prices and equity shares, define financial wealth of the Northern outsider,
51Note that fss = 1−α¯
η¯
and f∗ss = 1−α¯
η¯
.
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Λ(st), as the value of total asset holdings in terms of the North consumption good after history st,
Λ(st) ≡ P (st)λNN (st) + e(st)P ∗(st)λNS(st) ≡ ΛNN (st) + ΛNS(st), (B.35)
where ΛNN and ΛNS are the amounts of wealth invested in the two assets expressed in terms of
the North consumption good,52 and asset excess returns as
Rx(s
t) = R(st)−R∗(st), (B.36)
where R(st) ≡ P (st)+D(st)
P (st−1) and R
∗(st) ≡ P ∗(st)+D∗(st)
P ∗(st−1) are asset returns. The budget constraint of
the Northern outsider can then be written as
Λ(st) = qa(s
t)W (st)L(st) + ΛNN (s
t−1)Rx(st) + ΛNS(st−1)
e(st)
e(st−1)
R∗(st)− C(st). (B.37)
As shown in Devereux and Sutherland (2011), all the variables in the model can be written as
functions of the state variable Λ(st), for example, ΛNN (s
t) = ΛNN (Λ(s
t)). Each of these in turn
can be written as the Taylor series sum of various order terms, for example (suppressing the state
notation),
ΛNN (Λt) = ΛNN (Λ¯) + Λ
′
NN (Λ¯)(Λt − Λ¯) +O(2).
Taking second-order expansions of the four Euler equations in our model for additively separable
CRRA utility, we get after some algebra,
Et[γ(Rˆx,t+1 − eˆt+1)(Cˆ∗t+1 − Cˆt+1) + eˆt+1Rˆx,t+1 − eˆ2t+1] = O(3)
and
Et[Rˆx,t+1] = Et[
1
2
(Rˆ∗2t+1 − Rˆ2t+1) +
γ
2
(Cˆ∗t+1 + Cˆt+1)(Rˆx,t+1 + eˆt+1) +
γ
2
eˆt+1(Rˆ
∗
t+1 + Rˆt+1)],
where Rˆx,t+1 = Rˆt+1 − Rˆ∗t+1. Note here that the model satisfies Property 1 and Property 2 in
Devereux and Sutherland (2011) because, (i) the first expression above involves only products, and
hence first-order Taylor expansions of the variables are sufficient to evaluate it to the second order,
and (ii) the first-order terms of the Taylor expansion of the variables themselves are only functions
of the zero-order term of ΛNN , and hence also of λNN because ΛNN enters the model only through
the term ΛNN (s
t−1)Rx(st) ≈ Λ¯NN Rˆx(st) in the outsiders’ budget constraint, where Λ¯NN = P¯ λ¯NN .
The expressions above are analogous to equations (14) and (15) in Devereux and Sutherland (2011)
page 347.
52The fractions of outsider wealth invested in each asset are defined as αoNN =
ΛNN (s
t)
Λ(st)
and αoNS =
ΛNS(s
t)
Λ(st)
respectively.
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Since Properties 1 and 2 are satisfied, solutions to Λ¯NN and Λ¯NS (and hence λ¯NN and λ¯NS) can
be found by evaluating the left-hand side of the first expression numerically. The correct solution
would involve the left-hand side being zero up to a third-order approximation error. This fixed-
point procedure can be implemented by approximating the model variables required to evaluate the
expression up to the first order conditional on values of Λ¯NN and Λ¯NS , because these are functions
of the zero-order portfolio only. The precise algorithm followed is as follows:
1. The first step is to find a point around which to approximate the non-portfolio decision rules.
For the non-portfolio variables, this point is the unique stationary solution to the set of equilibrium
conditions of the model (when the scale parameter of the variance of the driving shocks is equal
to zero, the non-stochastic steady-state). The steady-state values of all non-portfolio variables are
provided in the previous section.
2. Use a ‘good’ guess for the portfolio variables Λ¯NN (and hence Λ¯NN , Λ¯NS and Λ¯NS).
53 Having
a ‘good’ guess just makes the procedure faster but any arbitrary guess would also suffice.54
3. Around the chosen steady state, find Taylor series approximation of the optimal dynamics of
the control and state variables using the algorithm developed by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004).
Extract only the first-order components of these because as argued above, these depend only on
the zero order component of portfolios, which is the object of interest.
4. Evaluate the expression Et[γRˆx,t+1(Cˆ
∗
t+1 − Cˆt+1) − γeˆt+1(Cˆ∗t+1 − Cˆt+1) − eˆt+1Rˆx,t+1 − eˆ2t+1]
(whose derivation is described above) using these first-order approximations for non-portfolio vari-
ables. Theoretically, this expression should be equal to zero up to a third-order approximation
error. In practice, if it is less than some small approximation error  then stop the procedure.55 If
not, update the guess for Λ¯NN and Λ¯NS (and hence λ¯NN and λ¯NS) and go back to step 2.
53To see why this is the case for steady-state portfolios, recall that the steady-state value of the non-portfolio vari-
ables do not depend on the value of the zero-order or steady-state portfolio. In particular, steady-state consumption
and labor income do not depend on the zero-order portfolio. Thus for two arbitrary portfolio steady states denoted
by 1 and 2 the values of portfolio shares must be related by: λNN1D
ss + λNS1D
∗ssess = λNN2Dss + λNS2D∗ssess =
(1 − α)Dss, where the last equality corresponds to a portfolio steady state without any foreign assets. Using the
stock market clearing condition in the foreign country, and the expression for steady-state stock prices, this reduces
to λNNP
ss−λSSP ∗ssess = (1−α)P ss− (1−α∗)P ∗ssess. We can use this condition to pin down λ¯NN , λ¯NS and λ¯NS
(and hence Λ¯NN , Λ¯NS , Λ¯NS) once Λ¯NN is found from the simulations.
54The simulations use as their starting guess the portfolios in Proposition 2 and then progressively perturb param-
eters like σ, γ, and η to find their effect on portfolios.
55, the stopping criterion, in all the simulations is set to be less than equal to the order of magnitude of the
standard deviations of model innovations raised to the third power, or O(3). Note that this is higher than the
approximation error predicted for the case where we have analytical solutions because in this case portfolios are
constant, so we only have the zero order portfolio without any of the higher order components of the portfolio.
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B.3.2 Algorithm for Insider’s Choice of Ownership for Given η and η∗
We are seeking the maximizer, α∗, of the function V (described in the body of the paper) that
maps insider ownership in the South, α˜∗, to expected lifetime utility of the Southern insider.
1. Outer loop A: Start with initial insider ownership α∗−1 in the South and α in the North,
the latter being fixed. Fix the interval within which to conduct the search for the best α˜∗ as [0, α∗−1].
2. Inner loop: Approximate optimal decision rules of the economy, including for outsider
portfolios, around the steady-state for the value of α˜∗ supplied by the outer loop. The output of
the inner loop will be the equilibrium decision rules for all variables of the economy, when insider
ownership values are α˜∗ and α in the South and North respectively. Keep both the first order and
second order components of the decision rules.
3. Outer loop B: Simulate the economy for 110,000 periods with decision rules (up to a
second-order approximation) from the inner loop, calculate the discounted sum of insider utility
over the last 100,000 periods only, and store. Update α˜∗ to a new value and go back to step 1.
4. After the outer loop has cycled through the grid of values α˜∗ ∈ [0, α∗−1], select the α˜∗ with
the highest discounted sum of simulated utility as the equilibrium insider ownership in the South,
α∗.
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